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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three separate but related essays investigating new
determinants of the underpricing of seasoned equity offering (SEOs). It also examines new
mechanisms and channels that affect the pricing of SEOs. The first essay examines the impacts
of earnings smoothing on SEO underpricing. It aims to investigate whether earnings smoothing
can add value to firms by reducing the degree of SEO underpricing. The findings show that
smoothing earnings performance resulting from discretionary accruals is negatively related to
SEO underpricing and improve earnings informativeness. This essay contributes specifically to
the current literature on earnings smoothing by demonstrating that high quality firms that expect
larger quantity of cash flow in the near future are more likely to actively smooth earnings via
discretionary accruals before SEOs to reduce underpricing. The second essay explores the role of
lines of credit in pricing seasoned equity offerings via market timing activities. This essay
provides evidence that lines of credit, while not perfect substitutes for cash holdings, give firms
the option to delay equity offerings until market conditions become more favorable, thereby
creating value for current shareholders. Interestingly, these effects are not observed when firms
are financially constrained. The third essay investigates the impact of covenant violations on
SEO underpricing. It also directly quantifies the changes in implied cost of equity surrounding
covenant violations. The results show that seasoned equity offerings are more underpriced after
covenant violations.

The findings show that firms that violate a covenant, on average,

experience an 8.4 % increase in the implied cost of equity. This suggests that creditors may force
violating firms to issue equity to lower leverage, thereby resulting in a higher degree of SEO
underpricing through the SEO episodes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

This dissertation consists of three separate, but related essays that investigate the roles of
earnings smoothing (essay 1), lines of credit (essay 2) and covenant violations (essay 3) on the
underpricing of seasoned equity offerings and the cost of equity capital.
There is a vast literature on the determinants of SEO underpricing. Both the theoretical
and empirical papers published thus far explain SEO underpricing based on uncertainty or
information asymmetry between issuers and outside investors, price pressure effects, pre-offer
price move and trading manipulation, transaction cost saving, and underwriter price practice
(e.g., Corwin et al., 2003). Prior studies based on uncertain or asymmetric information have
documented that the level of SEO underpricing is correlated with the level of information
asymmetry between issuers and investors. In a theoretical paper, Rock (1986) showed that
underpricing is necessary to ensure uninformed investors’ participation in the new offerings.
Without such compensation, uninformed investors would be less likely to purchase new shares,
because, in most cases, issuers are believed to issue only overvalued stock, as shown in the
perking order model of Mayer and Majluf (1984). Beatty and Ritter (1986) found support for the
positive relation between underpricing and ex ante uncertainty because of the winner’s curse
problem. Most empirical studies on SEO underpricing support the idea that underpricing is used
as a mechanism to signal firm quality to outside investors under information asymmetry (Allen
& Faulhaber, 1989; Baron, 1982; Benveniste & Spindt, 1989; Chemmanur, 1993). Along these
lines, in the first two essays (chapter 2 and 3) I expand the current literature by examining two
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new mechanisms that equity issuers can use to reduce their SEO underpricing via earnings
smoothing and the use of lines of credit in fostering market timing activities.
More specifically, the first essay contributes to the current literature by investigating the
effects of earnings smoothing on the underpricing of seasoned equity offerings. I find evidence
that firms with a long period of earnings smoothing prior to SEOs are more likely high quality
firms, which experience a lower degree of SEO underpricing. I also find that, based on the mean
value for SEOs, such smoothing reduces underpricing by $0.33 per share and increases the value
of the average offering by $1.65 million or 0.21 percent to the firm.
The second essay investigates the roles of lines of credit on SEO underpricing via market
timing activity. I find that firms accessing lines of credit are more likely to actively time the
market, because lines of credit, while not perfect substitutes for cash, give firms the option to
delay equity offerings, thereby reducing the degree of SEO underpricing. Interestingly, these
effects are not observed when firms are financially constrained.
The third essay (chapter 4) contributes to the current literature by quantifying the impacts
of covenant violations on the implied cost of equity and on the pricing of post-covenant violation
equity offerings. Using a unique dataset consisting of 1,045 first-time covenant violations from
1996-2011 of the US public firms and employing different models of implied cost of equity
capital estimation, I find that firms that violate a covenant, on average, experience an 8.48%
increase in the implied cost of equity capital. In addition, I also find a higher level of SEO
underpricing for equity offerings conducted by violating firms during the period immediately
following covenant violations. This suggests that creditors may require violating firms to issue
equity to lower leverage, thereby resulting in a higher degree of SEO underpricing through the
SEO episodes

2

Chapter 2
Earnings Smoothing and the Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offerings1

2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines whether high quality firms with persistent earnings smoothing
before a seasoned equity offering (SEO) can add value by reducing the offerings’ underpricing.
It provides new evidence on the positive relation between earnings smoothing and firm value
through SEO episodes, and its support of the view that earnings smoothing via discretionary
accruals improves the informativeness of future earnings. Based on the mean values for SEOs,
such smoothing reduces underpricing by $0.33 per share and increases the value of the average
offering by $1.65 million or 0.21 percent to the firm. This is a substantial increase in value that
can be obtained from a smoothing earnings’ strategy that, while relatively simple, is costly for
underperforming firms. The loss in value from underperformance is consequently more than just
the reduced stock price for outstanding shares. It includes a substantial opportunity loss
associated with any new financing obtained from equity offerings. Managerial opportunism and
information revealing hypothesis have been used in the literature to motivate earnings
smoothing. Managerial opportunism motives argue that managers use accruals to exploit

1 This chapter was previously published as a research article (co-authored with Oscar Varela) with the same title in
the Managerial Finance Journal, Volume 38, Issue 9, pp.833-859 (2012). The material in this chapter was coauthored by Anh Duc Ngo and Oscar Varela. Anh Duc Ngo had primary responsibility for generating the original
research ideas, collecting and cleaning data, and conducting empirical tests. Anh Duc Ngo was the primary
developer of the conclusions that are advanced here. Anh Duc Ngo also drafted the first version of this chapter.
Oscar Varela contributed to this chapter by refining the original ideas into testable research questions and revising
all versions of this chapter. See Appendix 2 for an email granting copyright permission from Emerald Group
Publishing Limited.
Note: This article (DOI 10.1108/03074351211248180) is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in this dissertation. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
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information asymmetry, manipulating current earnings to achieve various benefits to themselves
or their firms. Information revealing motives argue that managers smooth earnings to reveal
information about the firms’ future prospect. Both hypotheses have received support from a
number of theoretical and empirical studies.
Studies supporting the hypotheses that managers are eager to stabilize their earnings in
order to meet their bonus target or protect their job include the following. Bergstresser and
Philippon (2006) document that managers whose compensation packages are sensitive to
company share prices are more likely to lead their companies with higher level of earnings
management. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) construct a model to explain that managers use
earnings smoothing as a vehicle to secure their job positions, and a series of studies, including
Defond and Park (1997), have empirically supported this model.
Studies supporting the hypotheses that earnings smoothing can add value to firms by
reducing information asymmetry include the following. Trueman and Titman (1988) provide
evidence that high perceived earnings volatility increases the perceived risk of bankruptcy
probability of the firms, hence its cost of external financing. Francis et al. (2006) examine the
relation between cost of equity and seven attributes of earnings, including earnings smoothness,
and find that earnings smoothness is negatively associated with cost of equity, even after
accounting for cash flow volatility. Sankar and Subramanyam (2001) find that earnings
smoothing can reveal managers’ private information about future earnings, and conclude that
there is information advantage to allowing reporting discretion when managers have private
information beyond current earnings in a multi period framework. More recently, Tucker and
Zarowin (2006) find that firms with earnings smoothing improve the use of current and past
earnings in informing about future earnings forecasts leading to higher firm values. An
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implication from their results is that earnings smoothing should result in value premiums, ceteris
paribus.
In the present paper, using a sample of more than three thousand SEOs during the 21
year period 1989-2009, we find that smooth performance is negatively related to underpricing of
seasoned equity offerings, such that smoothing via discretionary accruals adds value to firms by
reducing the degree of SEO underpricing, while smoothing via cash flows does not.
Our findings are consistent with the results of recent studies on the effects of smooth
performance on firm value. Graham et al. (2005) document that corporate managers perceived a
positive market premium for lower earnings volatility, and Carter et al. (2006) find that the use
of derivatives to stabilize earnings improves firm value. Roundtree et al. (2008) also find, using
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value, that cash flow volatility has negative effect on firm value.
However, in contrast to our findings, they also find that earnings smoothing via accruals does not
add value.
Our findings that earnings smoothing reduces the degree of SEO underpricing lead us to
also investigate whether the volatility of contemporaneous discretionary accruals convey
information about future earnings, and through it, the underpricing of SEOs. The information
revealing hypothesis suggests that earnings smoothing improves the informativeness of past and
current earnings about future earnings. We consequently investigate the implications of this
relationship for SEO underpricing and post-SEO performance for both groups of firms, namely
high and low quality groups, consisting of firms with high and low levels of earnings smoothing,
respectively.
Using a modified version of Jones (1991) model to estimate discretionary accruals, we
find that the volatility of discretionary accruals is negatively associated with SEO underpricing,
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whereas volatility of cash flow (over a five year period prior to the offer date) is not related to
underpricing . These results are somewhat consistent with the findings of Subramanyam (1996),
which show that discretionary accrual returns are positively associated with future earnings, and
convey information about firms’ future prospects. Our results are robust to several proxies for
earnings smoothness, different estimation techniques, or various sets of control variables. We
control for possible endogeneity problems by using three stages least squares (3SLS) and a
system of simultaneous equations. The results obtained from 3SLS also support our results. We
also re-examine our results by using different proxies of earnings smoothing, including the ratio
of standard deviation of cash flows to standard deviation of net income, and the correlation
between accrual and cash flows. Our results are robust to these sensitivity tests.
We examine future stock returns and operating performance for SEO firms by calculating
portfolio-matched buy-and-hold (BHAR) and cumulative (CARs) abnormal returns for 6, 12, 18,
and 36 months after the issuing year. The results show that firms with a higher level of earnings
smoothing have higher ROA and EPS in every year over the three years following SEOs than
those with a lower level of earnings smoothing. The differences in ROA and EPS between the
two groups of firms are statistically significant. The findings are consistent with our prediction
that only high quality firms, which anticipate high levels of future cash flows, are able to actively
engage in smooth earnings over a long period of time prior to SEOs, thereby resulting in a lower
degree of SEO underpricing through the SEO episode.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides related
literature and motivation. Section 2.3 describes the research design and our SEO sample. Section
2.4 presents our empirical results around the SEO episode and Section 2.5 the empirical results
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for the post-SEO stock returns and operating performance. Section 2.6 presents the results from
various robustness tests. Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Related Literature and Motivation
Research supporting the managerial opportunism hypothesis shows that managers may
smooth earnings to meet the bonus target (Healy, 1985), to protect their job (Arya et al., 1998),
and/or to inflate earnings before exercising stock options (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006).
Those supporting the information revealing hypothesis show that firms smooth earnings to lower
their cost of equity and risk perceptions of investors, and signal high future performance and
high quality of earnings.
Theoretical models have attempted to explain why smooth earnings help reveal
information about firms’ future prospects. Channey and Lewis (1995) develop a model in which
high quality firms convey their future earnings through smooth earnings. They show that, with
asymmetric information, high quality firms inflate income in their financial reports more than
low quality firms and that the former smooth earnings whereas the latter do not. In this model,
high quality firms bear the cost of over reporting current period income via a tax burden to
separate themselves from low quality firms, given that low quality firms are presumed unable to
bear this burden. Only high quality firms can reveal information about future earnings by
smoothing earnings. Ronen and Sadan (1981), using Spencer’s (1973) signaling framework, also
argue that high quality firms with good future prospect are more likely to smooth their earnings
in order to reveal their quality. This is not to say that low quality firms may not also inflate
earnings before some specific corporate events such as mergers and acquisitions, but rather that
they are unable to do so over a long period of time given their poor future earnings.
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Graham et al. (2005) found that 97 percent of CFOs surveyed prefer smoothing earnings
with the belief that they lower the cost of capital and lead to more precise analyst’s earnings
forecasts. Tucker and Zarowin (2006) find a positive association between the degree of earnings
smoothing and future stock returns, and Rountree et al. (2008) find that investors place higher
value, measured by Tobin’s Q, on firms with smoother performance.
The existing literature suggests that the market can infer firm quality based on a firm
smoothing its earnings over a number of years. The present research aims to see if this prospect
can payoff for these firms when they engage in SEOs. We hypothesize that managers of high
quality firms with long historical smooth performance are more likely to push up the offer price
to maximize proceeds from equity offerings, such that firms with smooth earnings are more
likely to experience a lower degree of SEO underpricing episodes, compared with firms that do
not.
The SEO underpricing literature is extensive. Corwin (2003) finds that SEOs are more
underpriced for firms with high price uncertainty and bigger offer sizes. Kim and Shin (2004)
find, investigating short selling and underpricing, that offer discounts are negatively related to
underwriter rank and positively related to return volatility and underwriter spread. Cotton et al.
(2004) documents that price stabilization is negatively associated with trading volume, offer
price, and return variance.
More recently, Kim and Park (2005) examine the relation between earnings management
by SEO firms and their offer prices. They find that SEO firms that aggressively manage earnings
are also more likely to push up their offer prices and reduce the degree of underpricing. But in
contrast to the present research, they do not test for the relationship between earnings smoothing
and SEO underpricing. The longer term dimension of earnings smoothing suggests that it may be
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reasonable to believe that firms that smooth rather than manage earnings may have better longerterm prospects. Therefore we also test, beyond Kim and Park (2005), whether firms that engage
in long-term earnings smoothing prior to SEOs have higher stock returns and operating
performance in the three years after the SEOs, compared to those that do not or that engage in
shorter-term window dressing by managing earnings (before SEOs). This additional test aims to
disentangle alternative explanations of managerial opportunism versus information effectiveness
for long term earnings smoothing absent in Kim and Park (2005).
Indeed, the effects of smoothing performance on underpricing through SEO episodes
have not received much attention. To our knowledge, no empirical research to date directly
examines the relation between smooth performance and SEO underpricing. The objective of this
chapter is to fill this gap in the literature using a large sample of seasonal equity offerings from
the last two decades, and provide new evidence on the determinants of SEO undepricing.
2.3 Sample Description and Methodology
In this section, sample construction and offer date correction are discussed.
2.3.1 Sample Construction and Offer Date Correction
The 1989-2009 sample of U.S. common stock seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by nonregulated companies comes from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) New Issue Database.
The sample excludes initial public offerings and issues by non-U.S firms, as well as utilities and
financial firms. Only offerings after 1989 are considered because the 1987 SFAS No.95
mandated that firms provide cash flow statement in their financial reports.
The initial sample consisted of 6,859 offerings, with stock prices obtained from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and accounting variables from Compustat. For an
offering to enter the final sample, it was necessary that there be at least 8 quarterly accounting
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data points prior to the SEO, 250 prior trading days and 12 prior monthly returns, and sufficient
other data to compute discretionary accruals. All sample firms were listed on the NYSE,
NASDAQ, or AMEX. The methodology section explains in more detail where missing values
necessary for obtaining discretionary accruals required us to eliminate firms from the sample.
The sample size after these restrictions and deletions consists of 5,108 offerings.
Ritter’s reputation rank for each underwriter, obtained from Jay Ritter’s website,
supplements the data for our SEO sample2. Ritter evaluates each underwriter’s reputation based
on scores ranging from 0 to 9 (highest quality). We use each SEO lead manager’s name as the
identifier to obtain the Ritter underwriter ranking scores. The merging process reduces the SEO
sample to 3,156 offerings. Then, to avoid the effects of outliers, we winsorize the top and bottom
1 percent of the distributions of all variables. The final sample size consists of 2004 firms with
3,034 offerings.
Prior studies (Lease, Masulis, and Page (1991), Eckbo and Masulis (1992)) show that
offer dates directly obtained from the SDC database are often inappropriate for analyzing the
underpricing of SEOs due to the fact that some offers take place after the close of trading. For
example, Lease et al. (1991) investigate the time stamp from the Dow Jones News Service
(DNJS) and find that 25% of offers from 1981 through 1983 take place after the close of trading.
To address this issue, researchers have corrected offer dates for their analysis by applying a
volume based correction method. For example, Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) apply this
method and find that 18.4 % of offers during 1980-1991 required an offer date correction.
Following their method, we adjust our sample offer date as follows: If trading volume on the day
following the SDC offer date is (1) more than twice the trading volume on the SDC offer date,
2 Jay Ritter website at http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm
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and (2) more than twice the average daily trading volume over the previous 250 trading days,
then the day following the SDC offer date is designated as the offer date.
2.3.2 Control Variables
Prior studies document that the major determinants of SEO underpricing include the level
of information asymmetry, level of uncertainty about firm value, underwriter reputation, price
uncertainty, relative offer size, and conventional underwriter pricing practices (Altinkilic and
Hansen, 2002; Corwin, 2003; Kim and Park, 2005). These variables also used in this paper, are
defined as follows (see the appendix 1 for full descriptions).
Underpricing, the dependent variable in our multivariate analysis, is the closing price on
the offer day (CRSP: PRC) minus the offer price, divided by the offer price. An alternative
definition for our robustness tests is the closing price on the day prior to the offer minus the offer
price, divided by the closing price on the day prior to the offer. Earnings smoothness, Smooth, is
the ratio of the standard deviation of net income ([COMPUSTAT: IBQ] divided by the standard
deviation of cash flows from operation (defined as [COMPUSTAT: IBQ] minus accruals
[COMPUSTAT: ΔACTQ- ΔCHEQ- ΔLCTQ+ΔDLCQ-DPQ]) (both scaled by average total
assets (COMPUSTAT: ATQ)). The volatility of net income is scaled by cash flow volatility in
Smooth to measure the extent to which accruals are possibly used to smooth out the underlying
volatility of the firm’s operation, with higher values of this variable indicating more earnings
volatility. We expect a negative coefficient for Smooth. The standard deviation of operating cash
flows and net income are measured over twelve consecutive quarters, with a required minimum
of eight quarters. Our measure of Smooth is similar to that used in prior research (e.g., Leuz et
al., 2003; Francis et al., 2006; McInnis, 2010). Our primary measure of net income is net income
before extraordinary item (COMPUSTAT: IBQ). Cash flows equal net income less accruals.
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Accruals are the change in current assets (COMPUSTAT: ACTQ) minus the change in cash
(COMPUSTAT: CHEQ) minus the change in current liabilities (COMPUSTAT: LCTQ) plus the
change in shorter term debt (COMP: DLCQ) minus depreciation (COMPUSTAT: DPQ).
Stock price uncertainty, Volatility, is defined as the standard deviation of stock returns
(CRSP: RET) over the period of 30 trading days ending 10 days prior to the offer date. Corwin
(2003) finds that underpricing is associated with stock return volatility and bid-ask spread, and
many studies show that higher return volatility is associated with higher levels of underpricing.
We expect a positive coefficient for Volatility.
The effect of pre-offer price run up is controlled with the variable PreCar, calculated as
the cumulative adjusted return over the period of five trading days prior to the offer. Loughran
and Ritter (2002) show that equity issuers are more tolerant of excessive underpricing if they
simultaneously learn about a post market valuation that is higher than what they expected. This
suggests that issuers don’t need much bargaining effort in their negotiations over the offer price
with their contracted underwriters if they see the greater recent increase in their stock price. This
also implies that pre-offer abnormal stock returns are positively related to the magnitude of the
SEO underpricing. Thus, we expect a positive coefficient for PreCar. We follow Corwin (2003)
to control for the effects of price pressure with the variable Offersize, calculated as shares offered
divided by the total number of shares outstanding prior to the offer. Consistent with prior studies,
we expect Offersize to be positively related to underpricing.
Prior studies also find that conventional underwriter pricing practice may have an
important effect on SEO underpricing. Mola and Louran (2001) find that SEOs are clustered at
integers and do not tend to fall on odd eight fractions. Harris (1991) and Ball et al. (1985) argue
that rounded prices may reflect underwriter desire to reduce the costs of negotiating the offer

12

price and uncertainty about the underlying security’s value. Such rounding practices may reflect
the imprecise nature of the pricing process. Therefore, we include the control variable, Tick,
which is a dummy variable equal to one if the decimal portion of the closing price on the day
prior to the offer is less than $ 0.25, and zero otherwise. We also add the incremental variable
Ln(price) and the interaction term, Ln (price)*Tick to our base regression model. Based on
Corwin (2003), the sign of coefficients on Ln (price)*Tick and Ln (price) are expected to be
negative and positive, respectively.
Previous studies document that NASDAQ issues are more underpriced than NYSE issues
(Ritter and Welch, 2002) because of difference in trading practices. The dummy variable
Nasdaq, equal to one if the issuer was listed on NASDAQ, and zero if on NYSE or AMEX at the
time of offer, controls for this effect. We also include the variable IPOUnderpricing in our
regressions, measured as the average underpricing across all IPOs during the same month as the
SEO , where the monthly IPO underpricing estimates are obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.
The effect of underwriter reputation on SEO underpricing is measured by the lead
underwriter’s ranking, also obtained from Jay Ritter’s website. Ritter refines Carter and
Manaster’s (1990) ranking method to construct a new ranking database for major underwriters,
with rankings based on a 0-9 scale, from 1.0 to 9.0. Our final control variables are the firm’s risk
(Beta), firm’s size (Size, log of market value of equity ([CRSP: CHSO] multiplied by [CRSP:
PRC)), and book to market (BM, log of the ratio of book value of equity (COMPUSTAT:
CEQQ) to Size). We calculate beta from the regression of a firms’ monthly raw returns on the
monthly value-weighted market returns over the rolling five year window ending in the current
fiscal year of the offer date.
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2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 summarizes the characteristics of our sample SEOs. Table 2.1, Panel A
presents the descriptive statistics for the sample firms. Our sample firms have a $632.76 million
mean value of assets and $750.2 million mean equity market value. The average offering
proceeds for the whole sample is $126.8 million. On average, our sample’s return on asset ratio
is -0.0086 (median of 0.007) and earnings per share is 0.037 (median of 0.06). The mean and
median of market to book ratio is 0.49 and 0.36 respectively.
Table 2.1, Panel B presents the descriptive statistic for selected variables for the full SEO
sample during the entire 1989-2009 period. We define underpricing as the closing price on the
offer day minus the offer price, divided by the offer price.3 The mean (median) value of the
underpricing variable is 0.027 (0.013), which is statistically significant. The average
underpricing is equal to 2.7% of the offer price for the sample period. The mean and median net
income volatility is significantly lower than cash flow volatility. The mean (median) net income
volatility is 0.035 (0.018) versus 0.062 (0.046) for cash flow volatility. Recall that given our
definition of Smooth, the higher value of net income volatility relative to cash flow volatility, the
lower the level of smoothing. The mean and median values of Smooth are 0.540 and 0.459
respectively. Stock return volatility during a 30 day period ending 11 days before the offer date
is 0.033. A typical sample offer size is relatively large. The mean (median) of the relative offer
size, calculated as the ratio of the number of offered shares to the total shares outstanding prior to
the offer, is 0.249 (median of 0.18) or about 25% of shares outstanding.
Table 2.1, Panel C reports the offers’ characteristics across exchange markets. Consistent
with prior research, the degree of underpricing for NASDAQ offers is higher than NYSE and
3 We also use the closing price on the day prior to the offer minus the offer price, divided by the closing price on the day prior to

the offer, as an alternative definition in our robustness tests.
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AMEX offers. The mean (median) for SEO underpricing is 0.034 (0.022) for NASDAQ and
0.018 (0.007) for NYSE and AMEX offers, with the mean differences statistically significant (tvalue equal to -10.48). This is also the case for the volatility of cash flow and of net income.
Generally, NASDAQ offers have higher levels of return volatility, net income volatility, and
cash flow volatility than other exchange markets.
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for our sample of firms and our sample of SEOs. The sample contains all
SEO firms with available annual and quarterly data and matching data on CRSP during 1989-2009. The final sample
consists of 2,004 firms with a total of 3,034 SEOs during 1989-2009. All variables are described in the appendix 1.

Panel A: Descriptive Statistics on Sample-Firms (N=2,004 firms)
Variable

Mean

Std.

25%

Median

75%

Total Assets (M$)

632.76

2520

27.87

82.23

325.0

Equity Market Value (M$)

750.2

3663

43.33

122.7

378.9

Return on Assets(ROA)

-0.008

0.101

-0.016

0.007

0.021

Firm specific risk (Beta)

1.397

1.081

0.781

1.281

1.91

Earnings per share (EPS)

0.037

3.00

-0.100

0.063

0.241

Book to market (BM)

0.491

0.537

0.231

0.366

0.582

Panel B: Descriptive Statistics on Sample-SEOs (N=3,034 SEOs)
Variable

Mean

Std.

25%

Median

75%

SEO Underpricing (Underpricing)

0.027

0.045

0.000

0.013

0.049

IPO Underpricing (IPOunderpricing)

0.195

0.193

0.097

0.149

0.202

Offer proceeds (mil.)

126.8

209.5

35.00

67.40

132.0

Relative offer size (%) (Offersize)

0.249

0.343

0.112

0.180

0.287

Smoothness (Smooth)

0.540

0.356

0.239

0.459

0.811

Volatility of net income (std. dev.)

0.035

0.068

0.009

0.018

0.040

Volatility of cash flow (std. dev.)

0.062

0.072

0.029

0.046

0.075

Volatility of returns (Volatility)

0.033

0.017

0.021

0.029

Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for SEOs across Markets (N=3,034 SEOs)
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0.040

Variable

NASDAQ
(N=1785)
Mean
Median

NYSE and AMEX
(N=1249)
Mean
Median

0.0348

0.0225

0.0184

0.0071

IPO Underpricing (IPOunderpricing)

0.2036

0.1497

0.1794

Relative offer size(%) (Offersize)

0.2585

0.1971

Return on Assets (ROA)

-0.0164

Volatility of net income (std. dev.)

t-Test
t-Statistics
-10.48

p-Value
0.000

0.2347

-3.48

0.000

0.2347

0.1563

-1.74

0.081

0.0026

0.0043

0.0104

6.64

0.000

0.0447

0.0247

0.0217

0.0128

-10.60

0.000

Volatility of cash flow (std.dev.)

0.0718

0.0526

0.0499

0.0368

-8.98

0.000

Volatility of returns (Volatility)

0.0385

0.0343

0.0252

0.0228

-23.41

0.000

SEO Underpricing (Underpricing)

Table 2.2 reports Pearson correlations among the control variables to show whether the
correlations are generally consistent with our predictions. Our main variable of interest, Smooth,
where low values of Smooth indicate higher smoothing, appears to be significantly positively
associated with the level of SEO underpricing (ρ=0.094, p<0.01).

It appears that higher

smoothing via accruals is associated with a lower levels of SEO underpricing, or Underpricing
tends to be larger the greater the degree of earnings volatility.
We find no significant correlation between Underpricing and Firmsize suggesting that
firm’s size, on average, is not associated with the level of underpricing. However, relative offer
size (Offersize) and volatility of returns (Volatility) are positively associated with Underpricing
(ρ=0.029, p<0.01 and ρ=0.166, p<0.01), possibly reflecting the effects of price pressure on SEO
underpricing. We also find, consistent with earlier findings, that high reputation of underwriters
is negatively related to the level of underpricing (-0.153), and that higher pre-offer price run-ups
are positively related to the level of underpricing. The correlations generally support our
prediction that firms with smooth earnings are more likely to experience a lower degree of SEO
underpricing.
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Table 2.2 Spearman Correlation

Smooth

Smooth
1

PreCAR

Beta

Underpricing

Rank

BM

Volatility

Firmsize

PreCAR

-0.039
(0.029)

1

Beta

0.184
(0.001)

-0.004
(0.800)

1

Underpricing

0.094
(0.000)

0.437
(0.000)

0.060
(0.000)

Rank

-0.052
(0.003)

-0.004
(0.808)

0.013
(0.442)

-0.153
(0.000)

1

Volatility

0.230
(0.000)

-0.088
(0.000)

0.308
(0.000)

0.173
(0.000)

-0.198
(0.000)

1

BM

-0.130
(0.000)

0.008
(0.632)

-0.202
(0.000)

-0.021
(0.237)

-0.043
(0.018)

-0.132
(0.000)

1

Firmsize

0.017
(0.329)

0.035
(0.051)

-0.011
(0.532)

-0.130
(0.000)

0.496
(0.000)

-0.291
(0.000)

-0.246
(0.000)

1

Offersize

-0.051
(0.004)

-0.125
(0.000)

-0.063
(0.000)

0.114
(0.000)

-0.239
(0.000)

0.174
(0.000)

0.166
(0.000)

0.457
(0.000)

Offersize

1

17

1

2.4 Empirical Results around the SEO Episodes
2.4.1 Univariate Test
Table 2.3 presents the univariate tests results of the relation between earnings volatility
and SEO underpricing for quintiles of earnings smoothness (Panel A) or underpricing (Panel B)
in our sample, including t-statistics and p-values. Table 3, Panel A shows that both mean and
median levels of SEO underpricing increase monotonically across earnings smoothness quintiles,
with significant differences in the level of underpricing between firms with low versus high
levels of earnings smoothing. Firms that smooth earnings heavily differ systematically from
firms that smooth little or none at all. The mean of Underpricing in the lowest Smooth quintile
are 0.0212, compared to 0.0343 in the highest quintiles, with the difference statistically
significant at 1% (p-value <0.000). An average firm in the highest quintile of earnings
smoothness may reduce underpricing by 0.33 dollars, which based on the average offerings per
firm results in an increased value of $1.65 million, or 0.21 percent of firm value. This is a
substantial increase in value that can be obtained from a smoothing earnings’ strategy that, while
relatively simple, is costly for underperforming firms to emulate. In addition, the univariate
results show visible systematic patterns between Smooth quintiles and return on asset (ROA) and
earnings per share (EPS), respectively. A close examination of Panel A reveals that there is a
strong monotonic relation between level of earnings smoothing and ROA and EPS before SEOs.
For example, the average ROA and EPS of firms in the highest level of earning smoothness
quintile (lowest quintile of Smooth) are 0.016 and 0.211, respectively. These averages for firms
in the lowest level of earnings smoothing (highest quintile of Smooth) are -0.046 and -0.128,
respectively. The differences in the means (median) of ROA and EPS between the two bottom
and two top Smooth quintiles are statically significant at 1 percent level. Also, consistent with
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prior studies, variable Rank (PreCar) declines (increases) monotonically across earnings
smoothness quintiles.
Table 2.3, Panel B shows results that are quantitatively similar to those in Table 3, Panel
A, as Panel B also shows that there is a statistically significant difference in earnings smoothness
between the lowest and the highest underpricing quintiles. Our univariate tests demonstrate a
strong negative relation between earnings smoothness and SEO underpricing, and support our
hypothesis that SEOs from firms with smooth performance are relatively less underpriced.
2.4.2 Multivariate Tests
The dependent variable is Underpricing, and the independent variable of interest is
Smooth in the ordinary least squares regression results presented in this section. Our control
variables for other factors widely accepted in the literature on the underpricing of SEOs s are (1)
firm risk (Beta); (2) market to book (BM, using the ratio of the book value of total equity divided
by the market value of total equity; (3) cumulative market adjusted returns prior to the offer date
(PreCar); (4) IPO underpricing (IPOUnderpricing); (5) return volatility (Volatility); (6) firm
size (Size, the log of market equity); (7) relative offer size (Offersize); underwriter’s rank (Rank);
(8) Tick; (9) Ln(price), and (10) the interaction term between Tick and Ln(price) (Tick*Ln
(price)). We also use dummy variables (Nasdaq) to control for conventional pricing practices
and the different characteristics of stock exchanges. Our regression takes the following general
form.
Underpricing = α0 + α1Smooth+ α2Beta+ α3BM+α4PreCar+α5IPOunderpricing
+α6Volatility+α7Size+ a8Offersize+ α9Rank+ α10Tick+ α11Ln(price)
+α12Tick*Ln(Price) + α13Nasdaq+ε,
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(2.1)

Table 2.3 Univariate Analysis
This table presents univariate results. We group SEOs into quintiles based on their Underpricing and Smooth. Panel A reports mean of Underpricing and other
independent variables for earning smooth quintiles arranged from low to high. The difference in means of independent variables between the low and high
quintiles is shown at the bottom of the table along with the associated p-values in parentheses. Panel B presents results sorting on Underpricing quintiles. All
variables are described in the appendix 1 . Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Panel A: Quintiles Based on Smooth
Underpricing
0.0212
0.0230
0.0252
0.0333
0.0343

PreCar
-0.017
-0.023
-0.026
-0.027
-0.034

Beta
1.272
1.247
1.243
1.554
1.846

Volatility
0.2830
0.0296
0.0316
0.0368
0.0391

BM
0.527
0.502
0.519
0.493
0.433

Rank
8.126
8.032
7.992
7.885
7.879

-0.0131***
(0.000)

0.017**
(0.018)

-0.574***
(0.000)

-0.010***
(0.000)

0.094***
(0.000)

0.152**
(0.046)

ROA

EPS1

EPS2

EPSOP

Low
2
3
4
High

0.0162
0.0125
0.0032
-0.0248
-0.0463

0.2057
0.1458
0.0961
-0.2010
-0.0487

0.2031
0.1567
0.1089
-0.2055
-0.0565

0.2114
0.1805
0.1213
-0.0553
-0.1282

Difference (Low-High)
P-value

0.0625
(0.001)

0.2544
(0.001)

0.2596
(0.001)

0.3396
(0.001)

Low
2
3
4
High
Difference (Low-High)
P-value
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Assets
458.94
886.91
941.58
714.68
713.04
-254.1
(0.000)

IPOUnderpricing
0.177
0.184
0.197
0.214
0.201
-0.024**
(0.018)

Panel B: Quintiles Based on Underpricing
Smooth

PreCar

Beta

Volatility

BM

Low
2
3
4
High

0.5004
0.5061
0.5191
0.5256
0.6173

-0.0753
-0.0534
-0.0368
-0.0024
-0.0335

1.3990
1.3720
1.3968
1.3577
1.5116

0.0301
0.0306
0.0308
0.0322
0.0403

0.4932
0.5138
0.4975
0.4914
0.4805

8.2345
8.1385
8.1590
7.8737
7.5121

0.2012
0.1960
0.1825
0.1814
0.2143

Difference (Low-High)
P-value

-0.1169***
(0.000)

-0.0418***
(0.000)

-0.1126**
(0.055)

-0.0102***
(0.000)

0.0127
(0.720)

0.7224***
(0.000)

-0.0130
(0.283)
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Rank

IPOUnderpricing

Table 2.4 Multivariate Analysis
The results shown in this table are based on the regressions using the ratio of standard deviation of net income to
standard deviation of cash flow as a proxy for earnings smoothness. The table lists coefficients (p-values) from OLS
regressions of underpricing on Smooth, defined as the ratio of standard deviation of net income to the standard
deviation of cash flow, and a set of control variables. P-values are based on White’s heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors. All variables are described in the appendix 1 . Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Model
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Intercept
0.0473***
0.0604***
0.0472***
0.0473***
0.0620***

Smooth

Beta

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.0080***

0.0077***

0.0078***

0.0050**

0.0050**

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.018)

(0.019)

0.0004

-0.0002

-0.0006

-0.0006

(0.650)

(0.792)

0.4378

(0.446)

-0.0019*

-0.0019**

-0.0018**

-0.0017*

(0.068)

(0.035)

(0.049)

(0.051)

0.1655***

0.1921***

0.1921***

0.2002***

0.2002***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.0047

-0.0060

-0.0060

0.0013

0.0013

(0.267)

(0.171)

(0.169)

(0.761)

(0.759)

0.4596***

0.4626***

0.4652***

0.4329***

0.4340***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.0008

-0.0010*

-0.0010*

-0.0003

-0.0003

(0.106)

(0.056)

(0.058)

(0.555)

(0.573)

0.0064***

0.0070***

0.0070***

0.0052**

0.0052**

(0.009)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.014)

(0.014)

-0.0044***

-0.0044***

-0.0044***

-0.0032***

-0.0032***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.0001

0.0063

(0.917)

(0.452)

-0.0084***

-0.0078***

(0.000)

(0.000)

BM

PreCar

IPOUnderpricing

Volatility

Size

Offersize

Rank

Tick

Ln(price)

-0.0020

Ln(price)*Tick

(0.431)
Nasdaq

0.0063***
(0.000)

0.0062***
(0.000)
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0.0063***
(0.000)

0.0069***
(0.000)

0.0068***
(0.000)

The results support our hypotheses and consistent with its information role. The degree of
SEO underpricing is negatively associated with earnings smoothness, with Smooth coefficient
estimates ranging from 0.005 to 0.008 (p-value<0.000) across the five models. All regression
specifications have high explanatory power (adjusted R-squares range from 0.24 to 0.28 and
F-statistics are significant at 1%). The highly significant Smooth coefficients suggest that smooth
performance improves information about future earnings, thereby leading to a lower degree of
the SEO underpricing.
The coefficients of other control variables are also consistent with our expectations. For
example, coefficient estimates on PreCar, Offersize, Rank, and Nasdaq are of the expected sign
and statistically significant at conventional levels. In Models 3, 4, and 5 (Table 2.4), we
sequentially add Tick, Ln (price) and the interaction term Tick*Ln(price) to the base model, with
consistent results between these Models and Models 1 and 2. All coefficients for Smooth are
positively related to the degree of underpricing, and other coefficient estimates are of predicted
signs.
The coefficient on relative offer size (Offersize), with a magnitude of between 0.0052 and
0.007, is negative and significant at conventional levels in all model specifications, supporting
the existence of price pressure effects on the degree of SEO underpricing. The coefficients on
BM across all models are negative and statistically significant. This implies that high book-tomarket firms experience a lower degree of SEO underpricing than low book-to-market firms.
The coefficients on Beta, ranging from -0.0006 to 0.0004, are not statistically significant,
suggesting that firm beta does not impact SEO underpricing. The coefficients of underwriter’s
rank, ranging from -0.0044 to -0.0032, are significant at the 1 % level in all specifications,
suggesting that underwriter’s reputation plays an important role in reducing the level of
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underpricing. The coefficients on Tick<0.25 are consistently positive, suggesting that offers are
more underpriced when the previous days’ closing price does not fall on an even dollar amount
or $0.25 price increment. The results support the hypothesis that pricing practice is an important
factor affecting the level of SEO underpricing. In model 5, the coefficient on PreCar is 0.2 (pvalue<0.001), suggesting that large positive pre-offer returns lead to more underpricing. Unlike
prior studies (e.g., Corwin, 2003; Kim and Park, 2005), the coefficients on IPOUnderpricing are
not statistically significant in our models, implying that SEO underpricing is not related to IPO
underpricing. In addition, the coefficients on dummy variable Nasdaq are significantly positive,
showing that firms listed on NASDAQ have a greater degree of underpricing.
2.4.3 Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) Estimation Results
Possibly, the results may be biased if earnings smoothing, pre-offer stock returns, and
SEO underpricing are jointly and endogenously determined. To address this problem, we
examine the relationship between SEO underpricing and earnings smoothness by estimating the
following system of simultaneous equations using three stage least squares (3SLS) in the spirit of
Kim and Park (2005)4.
Underpricing =α0 + α1Smooth+ α2DA+ α3PreCar+ α4Volatility+ α5IPOunderpricing
+ α6Offersize + α7BM + α8Rank+ α9Tick+ α10Lnprc+ α11Lnprc_tick +α12Nasdaq+ε. (2.2)
Smooth= α0+ α1Underpricing+ α2DA+ α3PreCar + α4Offersize + α5BM + α6Total_accrual
+ α7Size+ ε,

(2.3)

PreCar= α0+ α1Underpricing + α2DA + α3Volatility + α4BM + α5Rank + α6Size + α7Beta
+ α8Nasdaq+ ε,

(2.4)

We anticipate the following signs in this system. Prior studies [e.g., Shipper (1989) and
4 Unlike Kim and Park (2005), we conduct Basman’ (1960) test to check the validity of overidentifying restrictions in our 3SLS
model specification. The Basman’s statistics provided by the test (via SAS Proc Syslin 3SLS with option/overid) fails to reject
the null hypothesis, with F-value=1.53 and p-value>0.2168.
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Bethel and Krigman (2009)] show that the likelihood that managers of SEO firms engage in
earnings management is higher the greater the level of information asymmetry. It follows that
the higher the stock volatility prior to an SEO, the higher the SEO underpricing. Outside
investors discount the share prices of firms with high levels of information asymmetry knowing
that their managers are more likely to engage in window dressing prior to equity offerings. We
expect a positive sign for the coefficient on Volatility in equation (2.2).
Low quality firms that intensively use discretionary accruals to inflate share prices prior
to SEOs experience a high level of SEO underpricing, as such opportunistic behavior is more
likely to be detected by outside investors or high quality auditors. Thus, the level of discretionary
accruals is positively associated with SEO underpricing, such that we expect a positive sign for
the coefficient on DA in equation (2.2)
Our argument that only high quality firms are able to smooth earnings over a long period
of time before equity offerings to reduce underpricing suggests that the sign of the coefficient for
Smooth in equation (2.2) is positive (the higher value of Smooth, the higher the earnings
volatility). Corwin (2003) also shows that underpricing is positively related to large abnormal
returns over the days prior to an SEO, such that we expect a positive coefficient on PreCar in
equation (2.2).
If high quality firms can smooth earnings over a long period of time, then such firms are
also more likely to experience larger pre-offer abnormal stock returns, suggesting a negative
coefficient on PreCar in equation (2.3). If earnings smoothing conveys managers’ private
information about future earnings, then the coefficient on Underpricing in equation (2.3) should
be positive, as firms with high levels of earnings smoothing prior to SEOs are more likely to
experience a lower level of underpricing.
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Finally, Gerard and Nanda (1993) find that pre-offer returns may reflect trading
manipulation where managers may intentionally depress the stock price to exploit outside
investors for the benefit of current shareholders through short selling around the SEO offer date.
They provide evidence that a high level of short-selling around SEOs is positively associated
with a high level of issue discounts, suggesting a negative coefficient on Underpricing in
equation (2.4).
We measure discretionary accruals for year t as the residuals from the following cross
section version of Jones model, modified by Kothari et al. (2005):
Accrual= α0(1/Assett-1) + α1* ΔSalet + α2 PPEt + α3ROA + μt ,

(2.5)

The total accrual (Accrual); change in sales (ΔSalet); and gross property, plant, and
equipment (PPE) are deflated by the average total assets (Assets) in this regression. The control
variable ROA is added to the Jones model to account for the effect of firm performance because
prior studies (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005) find that the Jones model is misspecified
for well performing or poorly performing firms. We estimate equation (2.5) by two-digit SIC
code and fiscal year, and then obtain a firm’s year t discretionary accruals by using the residuals
from the estimated regression. In order to distinguish the effects of short-term earnings
management (managerial opportunism) from long-term earnings smoothing (information
informativeness) on SEO underpricing, we use the total discretionary accruals over one year
prior to the offer date (DA), along with the Smooth variable in the 3SLS.
The results in Table 2.5 show that the coefficient on Smooth in (2.2) is significantly
positive (0.0335, p-value<0.002), such that earnings smoothness is negatively associated with
the degree of SEO underpricing, even after controlling for endogeneity via 3SLS. The DA
coefficient in (2.2) is also significantly positive (0.0106, p-value <0.05).
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Table 2.5 Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation on the Relation Between Earnings Smoothing
and SEO Underpricing.
This table presents results from the system of simultaneous equations as follows:
Underpricing =α0 + α1Smooth+ α2DA+ α3PreCar+ α4Volatility+ α5IPOunderpricing +α6Offersize +α7BM
+ α8Rank+ α9Tick+ α10Lnprc+ α11Lnprc_tick+ α12 Nasdaq+ ε,
Smooth= α0+ α1Underpricing+ α2DA+ α3PreCar + α4Offersize+ α5BM + α6Total_accrual+ α7Size+ ε,
PreCar= α0+ α1Underpricing + α2DA +a3Volatility+α4BM+ α5Rank + α6 Size +α7 Beta + α8Nasdaq+ ε,
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Underpricing (2.2)
Smooth (2.3)
PreCar (2.4)
Intercept
-0.3885**
3.4370***
1.2506***
(0.0027)
(0.000)
(0.000)
6.1709***
-5.0641***
Underpricing
(0.000)
(0.0011)
0.0335***
Smooth
(0.0020)
0.0106**
-0.3175***
-0.0102
DA
(0.0384)
(0.000)
(0.4610)
0.4245
***
-3.1818
***
PreCar
(0.001)
(0.000)
0.4410
***
1.0754
Volatility
(0.000)
(0.1086)
0.0045
IPOunderpricing
(0.1237)
0.0363***
-0.3795
Offersize
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.0012
0.0096
-0.0015
BM
(0.1579)
(0.3285)
(0.8023)
-0.0015
**
-0.0230
***
Rank
(0.0497)
(0.0045)
-0.0013
*
Total_accrual
(0.0869)
Tick
0.0064*
(0.0664)
Lnprc
-0.0107***
(0.0003)
Lnprc_tick
-0.0015
(0.1712)
Size
0.0202***
-0.0045
(0.000)
(0.1853)
Beta
0.0087
(0.1206)
Nasdaq
0.0057***
0.0334**
(0.000)
(0.0239)
System Adj. R2

0.1786

Basmann's (1960) test (F=1.53 p-value>0.2168)
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The significant coefficient on DA suggests that earnings management via discretionary
accruals one year prior to the SEO has a significant effect on SEO underpricing, consistent with
prior studies (e.g., Kim and Park (2005). As predicted, the coefficient on PreCar in (2.2) is
positive and statistically significant (0.4245, p-value<0.001). This suggests that the existence of
abnormal stock returns prior to the offer date also plays a significant role in the underpricing of
an SEO (after controlling for endogeneity). Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient for
Volatility is significantly positive in (2.2), with a magnitude of 0.4410, suggesting that higher
level of information asymmetry leads to a higher degree of SEO underpricing. The results in
Table 2.5 also show that the coefficients of DA and Total_accrual in (2.3) are statistically
significant, with a magnitude of -0.3175 (p-value<0.000) and -0.0013 (p-value<0.086),
respectively, implying that firms do smooth earnings via discretionary accruals. This also
suggests that SEO firms are more likely to intensively use discretionary accruals in the year prior
to equity offerings. Consistent with our prediRction based on Gerard and Nanda’s (1993)
manipulative trading hypothesis, the coefficient on Underpricing in (2.4) is statistically
significantly negative (5.0641, p-value<0.001). This suggests that insiders may manipulate share
prices through short selling activity, thereby leading to a lower level of pre-SEO returns. Overall,
we find clear evidence that earnings smoothness results in a lower degree of SEO underpricing,
even after controlling for possible endogeneity.
2.4.4 Cash Flow Volatility versus Accrual Volatility
Thus far, we have shown that earnings smoothness is negatively associated with SEO
underpricing, and more consistent with the information revealing than the information garbling
hypothesis. The former suggests that managerial discretion could enhance earnings’
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informativeness through communication of private information (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986;
Healy and Palepu, 1993; Subramanyam, 1996). Previous research also shows that accruals, on
average, have incremental information content above that provided by cash flow (Bowen,
Burghstahler, and Daley, 1987; Dechow, 1994). In this section, we examine whether cash flow
volatility or accrual volatility has more pronounced effects on SEO underpricing, and how each
of these incrementally contribute to the relationship between earnings smoothing and SEO
underpricing.We decompose earnings volatility following Rountree et al. (2008) into cash flow
volatility and accrual volatility, such that:

δ2Earnings = δ2 Cash flows + δ2 Accruals +2Cov(Cash flows, Accruals) (2.6)
where accruals are constructed as earnings less cash flows as described in .
The results in Table 2.6 show regression estimates of Underpricing on earnings volatility
and each of its components. The results as expected support the information revealing
hypothesis, implying that Accrual volatility has a strong negative relation to SEO Underpricing.
The coefficient estimate of Accrual volatility in Model 3 is -0.0045 (t= -1.83), so that a negative
1% change in accrual volatility leads to positive 0.0045% change in SEO underpricing, ,
suggesting that smooth earnings via accruals adds value. The coefficient of Accrual volatility is
statistically significant (at 10%), whereas the coefficient on Cash flow volatility is not,
suggesting that earnings smoothing via accruals reduces SEO underpricing beyond the cash flow
volatility.
Overall, the results in Table 2.6 show that earnings smoothing via accruals reveals
information about the firms’ future prospect, and that earnings smoothing via discretionary
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accruals over a number of years prior to the offer date leads to a lower level of SEO
underpricing.
Table 2.6 SEO Underpricing and Components of Earnings Volatility
This table presents results from cross sectional regressions of the Underpricing on each components of earnings
volatility. The components of earnings volatility include accrual volatility, cash flow volatility, and the correlation
of cash flows and accruals. P-values are reported beneath the coefficient estimates in parentheses. All variables are
described in the appendix 1. Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Model
Intercept
Ln(Earnings volatility)

(1)
0.0699***
(0.000)
0.0033***
(0.001)

(2)
0.0673***
(0.000)

Ln (Accrual volatility)
Ln (Cashflow volatility)
Correlation
Beta
PreCAR
IPOUnderpricing
Rank
Volatility
Offersize
Tick
Ln(price)
Ln(price)*Tick
Nasdaq
System Adj. R2

-0.0020
(0.498)
-0.0002
(0.767)
0.1748***
(0.000)
0.0017
(0.648)
-0.0031***
(0.000)
0.4242***
(0.000)
0.0046**
(0.029)
0.0096
(0.163)
-0.0066***
(0.000)
-0.0032
(0.140)
0.0063***
(0.000)

0.0017
(0.115)
0.0039*
(0.087)
-0.0001
(0.861)
0.1750***
(0.000)
0.0023
(0.547)
-0.0032***
(0.000)
0.4388***
(0.000)
0.0046**
(0.033)
0.0096
(0.161)
-0.0070***
(0.000)
-0.0033
0.1374
0.0067***
(0.000)

0.244

0.246
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(3)
0.0640***
(0.000)
0.0042***
(0.002)
-0.0045*
(0.067)
0.0026
(0.311)
-0.0067*
(0.079)
-0.000
(0.803)
0.1754***
(0.000)
0.0018
(0.638)
-0.0032***
(0.000)
0.4264***
(0.000)
0.0048**
(0.025)
0.0099
(0.149)
-0.0066***
(0.000)
-0.0034
0.1257
0.006 ***
(0.000)
0.247

2.5 Empirical Results on Post-SEO Market Returns and Operating Performance
2.5.1 Post-SEO Stock Returns Performance
We hypothesize that firms with high levels of earnings smoothing over long periods of
time before SEOs have higher stock returns after SEOs, compared to firms with low levels of
earnings smoothing, given that high quality firms with high anticipated future cash flows are
more likely to actively engage in earnings smoothing prior to SEOs. We use multiple approaches
widely used in the literature to calculate abnormal stock returns for both groups of firms over 6months, and 1-, 2- and 3-year periods following SEOs, and t-tests to examine for significant
differences. Specifically, we calculate for post-SEO periods (6, 12, 24 and 36 months) portfolio
matched buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), such
that:
∏

(

)

∏

(

)

(2.7)

where the mean is the weighted average of the firm’s BHARs, or
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ =∑

∑

and

(

)

(2.8)

where RBenchmark,t is the returns on corresponding value weighted size/ book to market (BM)
portfolio constructed by Fama and French (1993).
We apply the same portfolio matching procedure to calculate BHAR and CAR for each
firm. Two sub-samples from our main SEO sample are created, with the high (low) quality subsample including only firms from the top (bottom) two Smooth quintiles. We match at the
beginning of each offer year each firm in our two sub-samples to its corresponding portfolio out
of 25 portfolios using the 5x5 Size/BM breakpoints from WRDS’s Fama-French dataset.
Delisted firms are retained during the post-SEO windows to avoid survivorship bias by including
delisting returns and investing the proceeds in the matching size/BM portfolio. Following
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Mitchell and Stafford (2000), we calculate the value weighted average of the individual BHARs
based on market capitalization at the event year (offer year), scaled by the level of the CRSP
value weighted weights at each point in time. This procedure avoids the issue arising from
unstandardized value weights that would give more weight to the more recent observations.
Table 2.7 provides both BHAR and CAR results over different post-SEO window
horizons. Both the high and low quality sub-samples of firms – the top and bottom two Smooth
quintiles - outperform their benchmark portfolios by 5.6 to 10.36 percent (depending on use of
the value weighted BHAR or CAR) during the first six months following SEOs. Not surprisingly,
as well documented in the literature (e.g, Teoh et al., (1998), Loughran and Ritter (1997)),
performance deteriorates over the first two years following SEOs, as shown in Panels A and B,
although the high quality sub-sample outperforms the low-quality and the benchmark. For
example, in the 36 month horizon, BHARs and CARs show that the high quality sub-sample
outperforms the low quality by 34.72 percent (5.38 percent) on a value weighted BHARs (CARs)
basis (p-value=0.000). The performance of the high quality sub-sample persistently increases
over time, regardless of the measurement of abnormal returns used, whereas the low quality
performance deteriorates after 18 months following the SEOs.
2.5.2 Post-SEO Operating Performance
We also examine, in addition to stock returns, whether the post-SEO operating
performance measured by return on assets (ROA) and earnings per share (EPS) of firms with
high level of earnings smoothing are higher than those with low levels. Table 2.7 Panel C shows
ROA and EPS in the offer and next three post-offer years for the two sub-samples. In all postoffer years, ROA and EPS for the high (low) quality sub-samples are positive (negative), with the
difference statistically significant. The differences in ROA (EPS) between the high quality and
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low quality sub-samples are 0.22 (1.383), 0.184 (1.698), and 0.169 (2.562) percent in the three
years after the issue year, respectively.
Overall, the results for post-SEO stock returns and operating performance provide
evidence that managers of low quality firms may still benefit from misleading investors through
short-term earning management tactics surrounding SEOs by lowering the offer price through
SEO episodes. However, the performance of such firms would deteriorate in the long run. In
contrast, high quality firms that are able to smooth earnings over a long time-period prior to
SEOs not only experience a lower level of SEO undepricing, but also higher long run
performance. This finding supports our argument that only high quality firms that anticipate
large future cash flows are able to smooth earnings over a long period of time prior to SEOs and
are more likely to push up their offer prices, thereby experiencing a lower level of SEO
underpricing
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Table 2.7 Post-SEO Performance
This table presents post-SEO stock returns performance for two groups of firms based on levels of earnings smoothing. Panel A shows the average compounded
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for both groups over different horizons. Returns are compounded over 6, 12, 18, and 36 months after the offer date.
Panel B presents cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for high and low quality firms. Two sided p-values from conventional means tests are shown in
parentheses next to coefficients. All variables are described in the appendix 1. Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Month

Firm Type

Panel A: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns
(BHARs)
Equally-Weighted

6

12

18

36

Low quality (the top two Smooth quintiles )

Value-Weighted

BHAR

p-value

BHAR

3.2903**

0.0509

Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
(CARs)
Equally-Weighted

Value-Weighted

CAR

p-value

CAR

6.4170***

p-value
(0.000)

2.9918***

0.0019

5.6571***

2.8705**

0.0369

8.8890***

p-value
(0.000)

High quality (the bottom two Smooth quintiles )

0.3351***

0.0018

10.3634***

(0.000)

Difference (Low-High)

2.9552***

(0.000)

-3.9466***

(0.000)

0.1212***

(0.000)

-3.2319***

(0.000)
(0.000)

Low quality (the top two Smooth quintiles )

3.2961*

0.0678

2.3583

0.1644

1.5446

0.3038

-1.4150

0.3769

High quality (the bottom two Smooth quintiles )

2.4327

0.5641

10.3175***

(0.000)

-3.5694

0.1438

4.9259***

0.0036

Difference (Low-High)

0.8635***

(0.000)

-7.9592***

(0.000)

5.1130***

(0.000)

-6.3409

0.2863

Low quality (the top two Smooth quintiles )

0.8775

0.6959

-2.5727

0.1817

-0.4818

0.7907

-3.514***

0.0045

High quality (the bottom two Smooth quintiles )

-2.2059

0.5520

1.0437

0.7675

0.5603

0.8219

-4.228**

0.0372

Difference (Low-High)

3.0834***

(0.000)

-3.6164***

(0.000)

-1.0421***

(0.000)

0.7147***

(0.000)

Low quality (the top two Smooth quintiles )

-7.2301*

0.0801

-6.8072*

0.0543

-5.4059**

0.0268

-3.9882**

0.0480

High quality (the bottom two Smooth quintiles )

17.9644***

0.0023

27.9135

0.2469

13.0883**

0.0113

1.3954

0.6337

Difference (Low-High)

-35.194***

(0.000)

-34.721***

(0.000)

-18.494***

(0.000)

-5.383***

(0.000)

Panel C: Post-SEO Operating Performance Metrics for Both Groups
Year 0 (Offer year)

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

ROA

EPS

ROA

EPS

ROA

EPS

ROA

EPS

Low quality (the top two Smooth quintiles )

-0.1065

-0.5296

-0.1833

-0.6472

-0.1677

-1.2972

-0.1524

-2.0509

High quality (the bottom two Smooth quintiles )

0.0546

1.0069

0.0371

0.7362

0.0165

0.4016

0.0168

0.5121

Difference (High-Low)

0.161***

1.536***

0.220***

1.383***

0.184***

1.698***

0.169***

2.562***
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2.6. Robustness Tests
The results thus far use Smooth as the primary proxy for earnings smoothness. In this
section, two proxies for earnings smoothness are used as robustness tests. In the first, we use the
decile rank of the ratio of the standard deviation of net income to the standard deviation of cash
flows. Table 2.8, Column 1 shows that this new measure of earnings smoothness (the decile rank
of Smooth) is positively associated with Underpricing and significant at the 1% level (0.0008, pvalue=0.000).
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) argue that firms may use accruals to report smoother
earnings and conceal economic shocks to operating cash flow. A negative correlation between
accruals and cash flow, in their view, more directly measures earnings smoothing via accruals.
Thus, we use this correlation as proxy for earnings smoothness as a second robustness test.
Following Leuz et al. (2003) and Barton (2001), we use the correlation between quarterly cash
flows and accruals over the five-year period prior to the offer date. The results shown in Table
2.8, Column 2 suggest that the more negative the correlation between accruals and cash flows,
the less the degree of SEO underpricing. [Underpricing increases as the correlation becomes
more positive (less negative)].
As a final robustness test, we re-estimate our regression specifications with an alternative
measure of underpricing (Underpricing_discount), defined as the closing price on the day prior
to the offer minus the offer price, divided by the closing price on the day prior to offer. Table 2.9
shows that our main results remain unchanged.
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Table 2.8 Robustness Regressions
The results tabulated in this table are based on the regressions using the decile rank of the ratio of the standard
deviation of net income to the standard deviation of cash flow (model 1), and the correlation between cash flows and
accruals (model 2) as proxies for earnings smoothness. P-values are reported beneath the coefficient estimates in
parentheses. All variables are defined in the appendix 1. Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Underpricing
Model
Model 1
Model 2
Intercept
0.0582***
0.0667***
Decile rank (Smooth) (model 1)
Correlation (Cashflow/Accruals) (model 2)
Beta
BM
PreCar
IPOunderpricing
Volatility
Firmsize
Offersize
Rank
Tick
Ln(price)
Ln(price)*Tick
Nasdaq

Adj. R2
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(0.000)

(0.000)

0.0008***

0.0052**

(0.0014)

(0.033)

-0.0009

-0.0006

(0.341)

(0.369)

-0.0017*

-0.0019**

0.0903

(0.037)

0.2023***

0.2035***

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.0009

0.0011

(0.850)

(0.761)

0.4401***

0.4464***

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.0002

-0.0002

(0.705)

(0.681)

0.0051**

0.0054**

(0.016)

(0.013)

-0.0031***

-0.0034***

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.0068

0.0051

(0.420)

(0.452)

-0.0078***

-0.0077***

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.0024

-0.0018

(0.359)

(0.460)

0.0066***
(0.000)

0.0072***
(0.000)

0.281

0.289

Table 2.9 Robustness Regressions (Continued)
This table presents results obtained from regressing Underpricing_discount on alternative proxies for smoothness,
plus a set of control variables. P-values are reported beneath the coefficient estimates in parentheses. All variables
are defined in the appendix 1. Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Dependent variable: Underpricing_discount
Model
Intercept

(1)
0.0624***
(0.000)

(2)
0.0620***
(0.000)

(3)
0.0674***
(0.000)

Smooth (model 1)
Decile rank of Smooth (model 2)
Correlation (Cashflow/Accrual) (model 3)

0.0038**

0.0005***

0.0037**

(0.020)

(0.004)

(0.033)

0.0008

0.0008

0.0008

(0.146)

(0.156)

(0.154)

BM

-0.0007
(0.286)

-0.0007
(0.283)

-0.0007
(0.288)

PreCar

0.0764***
(0.000)

0.0764***
(0.000)

0.0765***
(0.000)

IPOunderpricing

-0.0060**
(0.041)

-0.0062**
(0.035)

-0.0056**
(0.049)

Volatility

0.3992***
(0.000)

0.0396***
(0.000)

0.4019***
(0.000)

Firmsize

-0.0001

-0.0001

-0.0001

(0.717)

(0.654)

(0.7805)

0.0026*

0.0027*

0.0026*

(0.098)

(0.093)

(0.096)

-0.0033***

-0.0033***

-0.0034***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

Tick

0.0041
(0.429)

0.0041
(0.426)

0.0040
(0.442)

Ln(price)

-0.0087***
(0.000)

-0.0086***
(0.000)

-0.0087***
(0.000)

Ln(price)*Tick

-0.0012
(0.446)

-0.0012
(0.445)

-0.0012
(0.457)

Nasdaq

0.0034***
(0.009)

0.0033**
(0.011)

0.0034***
(0.009)

Adj. R2

0.267

Beta

Offersize

Rank

0.268
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0.267

2.7 Conclusion
This study examines the relation between earnings smoothing and SEO underpricing. We
argue that high quality firms that expect larger quantity of cash flows in the near future are more
likely to actively manage earnings via discretionary accrual before seasoned equity offerings to
reduce the cost of capital and SEO underpricing. If high quality firms that are confident about
future earnings actively smooth earnings, it is plausible to assume that they also push their offer
prices up more aggressively.
In addition, market participants who observe a firm smoothing earnings over a number of
years prior to an SEO are more likely able to infer firm quality, since smoothing over a longer
period is more costly for lower quality firms. Taken together, we hypothesize that firms with
smooth performance over a number of years prior to the SEOs would have a lesser degree of
SEO underpricing.
Our empirical results support this hypothesis, such that earnings smoothness appears to
result in less SEO underpricing, based on a sample of more than 3,000 SEOs from 1989 through
2009. This relationship holds regardless of estimation techniques, earnings smoothness proxies,
or measures of SEO underpricing that are used. Three stage least squares estimation and other
robustness tests also support our hypothesis, even after controlling for endogeneity problems. We
also find evidence that firms with a long historical pattern of smooth earnings prior to SEOs
significantly outperform on a stock returns and operating basis those with more volatile earnings
in at least the three year period thereafter.
The economic significance of these results is such that smoothing reduces mean
underpricing by $0.33 per share and increases the mean offering value by $1.65 million (about
one-fifth of one percent of the mean offering firm’s value). A substantial increase in value is
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possible utilizing a simple strategy that is nevertheless costly for underperforming firms, who
suffer substantial opportunity losses from new equity offerings.
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Chapter 3
Lines of Credit, Market Timing, and the Underpricing of Seasoned Equity
Offerings
3.1 Introduction
In an efficient or frictionless capital market, firms theoretically should not worry about
raising external capital to fund acceptable new projects. Such projects would attract capital
whenever needed to maintain high levels of cash holdings to safeguard against liquidity shocks
or future investment needs.
In the presence of inefficient markets with frictions, firms need to guard against liquidity
shocks and maintain cash holding in order to honor their contractual obligations or to not bypass
positive NPV projects. Cash holdings can provide firms with flexibility in their financing
activity; high levels of cash holdings can also result in managerial entrenchment or wealth
expropriation by managers (Jensen, 1986). To minimize the agency and managerial
entrenchment problems, firms need to trade-off between the benefits and costs of holding cash
by equating marginal benefits with marginal costs in their cash management decisions. One
solution to these agency problems is for firms to obtain lines of credit, loan commitments or
credit revolving facilities, from commercial banks for liquidity management. The literature on
the role of lines of credit in liquidity management shows two major advantages. First, firms can
use lines of credit as options to hedge against credit worthiness deterioration or credit rationing
(e.g., Campell, 1978; Hawkins, 1982). Firms with lines of credit are theoretically allowed to
borrow from a lender in any amount up to specific limit at the specified price (Duan and Yoon,
1993). As such, firms can reserve their unused lines of credit or committed loans as liquidity
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insurance for future liquidity shocks. Second, firms facing high degrees of information
asymmetry may see a line of credit as an optimal solution to cope with asymmetric information
problems in non-cooperated games between borrowers and lenders (e.g., Thakor and Udell,
1987, Booth at al., 1991). By paying small upfront fees for committed loans, informationally
problematic borrowers facing high costs of raising equity can use lines of credit as options to
hedge against adverse liquidity shocks when valuable investment projects arise. As such,
obtaining lines of credit instead of hoarding cash may reduce managerial agency free cash flow
problems.
Bank lines of credit theoretically give firms flexibility in their financing decisions with
regard to future projects. However, they are not a perfect substitute for cash, although lines of
credit are preferred to cash, even though U.S. firms still hold significant amount of cash in their
balance sheets (Bates et al, 2009). Bank loan commitments are usually contingent on firm
performance and require a specified set of financial ratios. Firms that want to obtain lines of
credit to guard against future liquidity shocks have to maintain their financial performance at a
level required by their lenders, among which is a certain level of cash holdings. That is, credit
lines are positively associated with the level of firm’s cash holdings. For example, Sufi (2009)
empirically shows that 87% of public firms in the U.S. have access to lines of credit, and that
lines of credit and cash are not perfectly substitutable in liquidity management.
I am aware of no other studies that have investigated the effects of lines of credit on
market timing and capital structure. Using line of credit information directly retrieved from
filings on SEC’s Edgar databases, I unveil a different role for lines of credit in creating more
value for the firm. First, I document that firms accessing lines of credit are more active in
marketing timing, compared to firms that don’t access lines of credit. Using three measures that
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capture market timing behavior, I find clear evidence that the capital structure of firms with lines
of credit are affected more by market timing activity than the capital structure of similar firms
without lines of credit. Interestingly, this finding is somewhat contrary to the conventional
intuition that firms accessing lines of credit are more likely to use commercial loans for their
financing needs, thus leading to a higher financial leverage.
Second, I posit that the effects of lines of credit on capital market timing depend on a
firm’s financial health. In the presence of financial constraints, there is a critical role for
corporate liquidity policy, making the choice for cash and credit lines important. Generally,
financially constrained firms find it difficult to raise external financing when they need to
sponsor new investment opportunities. Higher cash holdings are more valuable for constrained
firms than for unconstrained firms because constrained firms are more likely to rely on internal
financing resources: cash flow and cash holdings as ways of preserving financial flexibility,
given the high costs of external financing (e.g., Bate at al. (2006), Almeida, Campello, and
Weisbach (2004), Almeida and Camplello (2010)). My second argument is simple. High cash
holdings in constrained firms, particularly those without investment opportunities, may impede
their market timing activities since the marginal benefit of additional cash holdings from timing
equity offerings does not outweigh the costs of hoarding too much cash in terms of agency
problems. In addition, I also argue that the role of lines of credit in market timing activity can be
more pronounced for unconstrained firms that can relatively easily access to other source of
funds, including external equity and cash flows. That is, unconstrained firms can use both lines
of credit and cash holdings saved out of their cash flows as a buffer for temporary liquidity needs
while waiting for the market to become more favorable for their new equity offerings. As such,
lines of credit are not only used as options on liquidity to fund future investment opportunities,
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but also as a vehicle to strategically pursue timing the equity market, especially for
unconstrained firms. While it could be argued that all firms have incentives to take advantages
of lines of credit to time their equity issues by postponing their offerings in unfavorable market
conditions, financially constrained firms find it more difficult to time their equity issues since
lines of credit are generally offered contingent on a certain threshold of cash holdings. That said,
lines of credit are possibly much more valuable for unconstrained firms with respect to equity
market timing. Thus, I analyze the impact of lines of credit on two separate subsamples:
financially constrained and non-financially constrained. I sort firms into constrained and nonconstrained samples based on different criteria widely accepted in the literature, including KZ
index, Altman’s Z score, and Ohlson’s O-score. Under each of our three constraint criteria, I find
that the impact of lines of credit on market timing is particularly strong for unconstrained firms
while there is no impact at all of lines of credit on marketing timing for constrained firms.
Finally, I examine the roles of lines of credit in lowering the underpricing of seasoned
equity offerings (SEOs). If firms accessing lines of credit are more active in market timing, then
I also expect that such firms can delay equity offerings during the periods of unfavorable market
conditions and conduct offerings when market conditions are more favorable, thereby leading to
a lower degree of SEO underpricing. The results support my prediction, irrespective of which
measure of underpricing I use.
I also perform two matched sample analyses to test robustness of my results. First, I
randomly select 75 firms (about half of the non-credit line sample) and paired-match them to 75
firms in the credit-line sample with the same level of total assets, return on assets, tangible
assets, and two-digit SIC code in their IPO years. The second method involves conducting the
propensity score matching. I match 75 randomly selected firms in the non-credit line sample with
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75 firms in the credit line sample on the basis of their propensity score, which is a measure of the
firm’s propensity to have a line of credit based on the firm’s characteristics. The results based on
matched sample analyses confirm our previous findings. That is, firms accessing lines of credit
are more likely to engage in market timing and experience a lower degree of SEO underpricing.
Overall, this chapter looks at the role of lines of credit in a different perspective by
examining the effects of lines of credit on market timing and SEO underpricing, thus enriching
the current literature on capital structure, equity offerings, and lines of credit. The chapter not
only provides insights on the roles of lines of credit in market timing activity, but also shed light
on how lines of credit can create more value by lowering the level of underpricing through SEO
episodes. This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents some related literature on the
relationship between market timing and capital structure. Section 3.3 presents the method and
our proxies for market timing. Section 3.4 provides evidence on the effects of lines of credit on
capital structure and equity timing activity. Section 3.5 examines the effects of lines of credit on
SEO underpricing. Section 3.6 discusses the robustness tests. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Related Literature
In corporate finance, equity market timing can be understood as a corporate practice that
allows firms to create more value by capturing their stocks’ misvaluation. This suggests that
firms are more likely to issue equity when their stocks are overvalued and repurchase when their
stocks are undervalued (Myer and Majluf,1984, Lakonishok et al., 1994). As a result, firms may
issue equity when this form of external capital is cheap even if the financing is not necessary.
On the other hand, firms may not issue equity when they experience temporary liquidity shocks
(Stein, 1996; Huang and Ritter, 2009). Instead, firms may use debts or short term borrowings to
satisfy their immediate financing needs to delay equity issuances until favorable market
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conditions appear. Graham and Harvey (2001) find that two thirds of the participants in an
anonymous survey of 500 Fortune CFOs admit to market timing capital structure decisions, with
an important factor being the amount by which their stocks are over or undervalued.
Subsequent studies on market timing such as those by Baker and Wurgler (2002),
Gompers and Lerner (2003), and Kayhan and Titman (2007) document the prevalence of equity
timing strategies with respect to capital structure decisions. Baker and Wurgler (2002) are the
first among those supporting the market timing theory of capital structure by conducting a direct
test on how market timing affects capital structure. They propose that current capital structure is
the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the market. To test this proposition, they
construct a variable, namely “external finance weighted average” that measures the relevant
historical valuation in market valuations. This variable takes high values when firms raise equity
during periods of high market valuations (high market to book ratio) and low values during
periods of low market valuations (low market to book ratio). This variable is used as a proxy for
market timing for regression specifications that examine the effects of market timing on book
value and market leverage. Since the authors control for current investment opportunities in the
form of current market to book ratios in the regressions, the proxy variable “external finance
weighted average” can pick up the transient market timing opportunities. Based on this novel
proxy for market timing, Baker and Wurgler (2002) are able to show that firms do time the
equity market such that the current capital structure is a cumulative outcome of a firm’s past
equity timing activities. Following these lines of argument, several researchers use more refined
proxies for market timing to further investigate the effects of past equity market timing activity
on capital structure. Their findings also provide evidence that market timing is one of the most
important factors affecting capital structure decisions.
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More recently, Huang and Ritter (2009) test the marketing timing theory of capital
structure using variables that control for both the pecking order and static tradeoff hypothesis.
They compare the cost of debt to the cost of equity, after controlling for time trend and other
firm specific and macroeconomic conditions, and find that firms fund a large portion of a
financing deficit with proceeds from equity offerings raised in years when the cost of equity is
low. They also find that equity issuance has a persistent effect on capital structure for many
years, such that firms adjust slowly toward their target leverage after equity issuance. Along
these lines, Warr et al. (2012) find that firms take advantage of equity mispricing to accelerate
adjustments toward leverage target when their equity is overpriced.
While the literature on liquidity management is vast, there are few studies focusing on
lines of credit. Only recently, Sufi (2009) recognized this limitation and conducted the first
empirical study on the role of credit lines on liquidity management. Lines of credit can
theoretically be used as a substitute for cash to guard against liquidity shocks (Holmstrom and
Tirole 1998; Boot et al., 1987), but empirical studies show that their role in liquidity
management is not crucial as compared to that of cash holdings. Lines of credit may become a
viable liquidity substitute for cash only for firms with high levels of cash flow, because lending
banks usually employ minimum cash flow based financial covenants for firms to quality for
lines of credit. Cash strapped firms therefore have difficulty initiating or renewing lines of
credit. (Sufi, 2009). The purpose of the current research in the context of this literature is to
understand why lines of credit, though not perfectly substitutable for cash, are valued differently
in constrained and non-constrained firms relative to market timing. I examine whether lines of
credit have effects on market timing and, if so, what are the differential effects of the timing
behavior for constrained versus non-constrained firms.
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3.3 Sample Description and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Sample Construction
The data for this paper comes from several sources. First, I begin with the universe of all nonfinancial U.S. firms in Compustat from 1996 through 2006 for which I can identify their IPO
dates from SDC platinum and Jay Ritter’s IPO databases. I focus on the 1996-2006 periods due
to the following reasons. First, the SEC has required that all firms submit their electronic filings
to SEC’s Edgar database since 1996, thereby allowing me to employ a text search algorithm (a
web crawler) to retrieve information on lines of credit from annual 10-K filings. Second, I need
to follow up firms for up to ten years after their IPOs to examine the evolution of their capital
structures during the sample period. Third, I use a web crawler to search for firms’ credit line
information, but still need to engage in the time consuming process of manually reading data on
the sample firms to confirm that the crawler correctly identified said firms. Finally, I check the
results based on my dataset in a robustness test against those in the 1996-2002 dataset kindly
provided by Prof. Sufi of the University of Chicago. I restrict my sample to firms that have at
least four consecutive years of positive assets and book leverage over the sample period. I also
exclude firms, following Baker and Wurgler (2002), with book value of assets below $10
million, and firms without complete total assets data between the IPO year and the year the firm
exits Compustat. This filtering process leaves me with a sample of 1,017 firms with 9,391 firm
year observations.
Next, much like Sufi (2009), I program a web crawler that searches every 10-K annual
filing to identify a firm’s access to a line of credit. Specifically, I link each firm year observation
from our sample to its respective 10-Q or 10-K SEC filing through its CIK identifier provided by
both SEC-Edgar and Compustat. The webcrawler searches for seven phrases that may identify
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access to a line of credit in each firm’s electronic filing on the SEC’s Edgar database. The seven
phrases are: “lines of credit,” “committed loans,” “revolving credit facilities,” “revolving credit
agreement,” “bank credit line”, “credit lines,” and “working capital facilities”. Whenever the
program finds one of these search phrases, it retrieves related information such as the CIK or
GVKEY from the filings and downloads the paragraph containing said phrases into an excel file.
This information is then manually checked to avoid a Type I error, where the null hypothesis of
no line of credit is rejected when in fact it is true. I create a dummy variable (Linedummy) that
takes the value of 1 if a firm has a line of credit in a given year, and zero otherwise.
Using CIK identifier and links provided by the SEC on its website, the text search
program identified 958 firms with 8,203 firm year observations for which information on lines of
credit exists every year during the period 1996-2006. Due to missing data for my timing
measures and control variables, and the requirement that the market-to-book ratio be less than
10, the usable size of the dataset for regression analysis consists of 568 firms with 5,216 firm
year observations. I then split the full sample into two subsamples, the credit line and non-credit
samples, depending on whether firms have a line of credit or how often they access their line of
credit over the sample period. For the main regressions, I sort firms that do not have lines of
credit in any year over the sample period and firms that have at least one year accessing lines of
credit during the sample period into non-credit line and credit line samples, respectively. The
first subsample, in which lines of credit are not available, consists of 145 firms, and the second
subsample consists of 423 firms. For robustness, I classify firms that have lines of credit for less
than three years over the 10-year sample period as non-credit line firms and firms accessing lines
of credit more than two years over the 10-year sample period as credit line firms. This sorting
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method leaves me 217 firms in the first sample and 351 firms in the second sample. I winsorize
all variables in the regressions at the 1% and 99% levels to avoid outliers.
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample during 1996-2006.
The average total asset for the firm year observations is $414.12 million. The average book
leverage and market leverage are 0.489 and 2.65, respectively. While the mean EBITDA for the
full sample is a negative 1.47 % at the total book assets, the median firm has operating earnings
of 8.03 % of total assets. The mean and median of the market to book value ratio are 2.648 and
1.787, respectively.
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for sample of firms with and without a line of credit during 1996-2006. The
sample contains all firms with available annual data on Compustat data and matching data on SDC’s IPO sample
during 1996-2006. The final sample (after excluding financial firms, firms with book leverage greater than 1 and
market to book greater than 10) consists of 568 firms with 5,216 firm year observations. Firms with minimum book
assets below $10 million and firms without complete data on total assets between the IPO year and the year the firm
exit Compustat are also excluded. Market-to-Book (MB) ratio is assets minus book equity plus market equity all
divided by assets. Book leverage (BL) is book debt to assets (in percentage term). Market leverage (ML) is book debt
divided by the result of total assets minus book equity plus market equity (in percentage term). Tangibility is total
tangible assets include plant, property, and equipment. Profitability is defined as earnings before interest and debt
divided by total assets. Capital expenditure (Capex) is the total capital expenditures divided by total assets.

Panel A: Descriptive Statistics on pooled sample (552 firms with 5,046 firm-year observations)
Variable

Mean

Std.

25%

Median

75%

Total Assets (M$)

414.117

1601.80

36.449

100.350

305.210

Market-to- Book (MB)

2.648

3.068

1.144

1.787

3.091

Tangibility(PPE)

99.146

347.238

3.669

14.22

60.286

Profitability(EBITDA/TA)

-0.0147

0.3911

-0.0635

0.0803

0.1541

Capital Expenditures (CAPEX/TA)

0.0645

0.0785

0.0194

0.0403

0.0783

Book Leverage (BL)

0.4887

0.6661

0.2081

0.3762

0.6019

Market Leverage (ML)

0.3016

0.2705

0.0784

0.2044

0.4791

Panel B: Descriptive Statistics on Line of Credit Sample (3,193 firm-years)
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Variable

Mean

Std.

25%

Median

75%

Total Assets (M$)

473.482

1829.78

46.241

128.382

365.134

Market-to- Book (MB)

2.2302

2.3309

1.0449

1.5174

2.5555

Tangibility(PPE)

122.260

403.963

6.025

22.118

86.022

Profitability(EBITDA/TA)

0.0375

0.3110

0.0110

0.0987

0.1654

Capital Expenditures (CAPEX)

0.0691

0.0776

0.0229

0.0447

0.0857

Book Leverage (BL)

0.5012

0.5569

0.2590

0.4188

0.6370

Market Leverage (ML)

0.3495

0.2725

0.1130

0.2722

0.5480

Panel B: Descriptive Statistics on Non-Line of Credit Sample (145 firms with 1,353 firm-years)
Variable

Mean

Std.

25%

Median

75%

Total Assets (M$)

332.90

118.750

28.366

66.636

214.008

Market-to- Book (MB)

3.2212

1.4084

1.4081

2.2178

3.7735

Tangibility(PPE)

67.525

246.178

2.192

7.351

33.719

Profitability(EBITDA/TA)

-0.0863

0.4709

-0.1856

0.0333

0.1338

Capital Expenditures (CAPEX)

0.0581

0.0797

0.0159

0.0343

0.0699

Book Leverage (BL)

0.4715

0.1581

0.7911

0.3046

0.5778

Market Leverage (ML)

0.2359

0.2534

0.0504

0.1285

0.3422

I also partition firms in the full sample into two subsamples - line of credit and non-line
of credit sub-samples. Table 3.1, Panels B and C, shows descriptive statistics for these subsamples. The $473.48 million average total asset values for the credit line sub-sample is higher
than the $332.90 million for the non-credit line sub-sample. Similarly, the average book leverage
(market leverage) ratios of 0.5012 (0.4715) for the credit line sub-sample are higher than the
0.3016 (0.2359) for the non-credit line sub-sample. This suggests that firms accessing lines of
credit depend more on commercial loans for their financing needs.
Credit line sample firms are also more profitable. The mean (median) of return on assets
are 0.0375 (0.0987) for the credit line sub-sample and -0.0863 (0.0333) for the non- credit lines
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sub-sample. Firms in the line of credit sub-sample have more tangible assets, on average, than
firms in the non-credit line sub-sample, as the mean is 122.26 for the former versus 67.53 for the
latter. Firms with credit lines have higher capital expenditures than firms without credit lines,
consistent with the prior studies (e.g., Sufi, 2009) that profitable firms with high cash flow are
critical to obtaining a line of credit.
3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 Proxies for Market Timing using Previous Mispricing Measures
I use two commonly adopted mispricing measures for our marketing timing variables.
First, I follow Baker and Wurgler (2002) to construct a timing measure, which is the “external
finance weighted average market to book ratio-MBEFWAt-1”. This measure captures market
timing behavior such that firms are more likely to issue equity when their stock prices are high
and issue debt when their stock prices are low. The main argument in Baker and Wurgler (2002)
is that the fluctuations of market valuation, which can be observed by changes in the market-tobook ratio, have a long run impact on capital structure. Firms take advantage of “window of
opportunities” or stock misvaluations by issuing both equity and/or debt, as appropriate,
affecting capital structure. The Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) mispricing timing measure
(BW_timing) is defined as follows:
BW_timing=MBEFWAt-1 =∑

∑

(

) (3.1)

where 0 is the IPO year or the first year the firm entered Compustat; EFs and MBs denote the sum
of net debt and equity issued and the market-to-book ratio, at time s; and EF is the sum of net
equity and net debt issued. Net equity issue is defined as the change in book equity, minus the
change in retained earnings, divided by total assets. Newly retained earnings are defined as the
change in retained earnings divided by total assets. Net debt issue is defined as the residual
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change in assets divided by total assets. Market value is defined as total assets minus the book
value of equity plus the market value of equity.
Baker and Wurgler (2002) develop this measure of market timing based on traditional
theories that view market-to-book ratios as the measure of investment opportunities and market
misvaluations. Used as a proxy for equity mispricing; higher market-to-book ratios reflects
higher equity mispricing. Firms seek lower costs of financing by raising equity when their
market-to-book ratios are high and issuing debt when their market-to-book ratios are low. This
measure will take high values for firms that raised external financing when the market-to-book
was high and vice versa. Baker and Wurgler (2002) are also aware that market-to-book can
capture investment prospects that lead to a negative relationship between capital structure and
their proxy for market timing. They use the lagged one period market-to-book ratio in their
regressions to control for the effects of investment opportunities.
Second, I follow Kayhan and Titman (2007) to construct a different proxy - the yearly
market timing measure - for market timing. This new variable as argued by Kayhan and Titman
(2007) is more effective than that of Baker and Wurgler (2002) in capturing a firm’s timing
behavior because the new measure excludes the average market to book (̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅) embedded in the
former measure that capture investment opportunities. Specifically, they suggest the following
decomposition:
∑

∑

(

(

)=

)

+ (̅̅̅̅̅̅)

)

)

̅̅̅̅
∑

Yearly timing (YT) =(

Long-term timing (LT)=(∑

(

(
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)

(3.2)

̅̅̅̅ ̅̅̅̅̅= Cov (EF, M/B)
) (∑

) =̅̅̅̅̅̅ ̅̅̅̅

(3.3)
(3.4)

where the summations are taken for each firm-year observation over the study period (19962006). In the spirit of Baker and Wurgler (2002), Kayhan and Titman (2007) construct a timing
measure (equation 3.2) and yearly timing measure (equation 3.3) by disentangling the
relationship between the market-to-book ratio, with market timing and pecking order effects. The
role of yearly timing measure is somewhat similar to that of Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) external
weighted average market-to-book ratio. The long-term timing measure captures the effects of
pecking order on financing activity, rather than market timing per se. Equation (3.2),
decomposes Baker and Wurgler (2002) timing measure into the covariance between financing
deficit and market-to-book ratio, and the mean market-to-book ratio. Kayhan and Titman (2007)
posit that the first term in their decomposition in equation (3.2), or yearly market timing scaled
by average financing deficit, is superior to Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) measure, since the new
measure may prevent a spurious link due to correlation between the timing measure and
investment opportunities by excluding the average market-to-book ratio ((̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅) . As such, I use
the second timing measure as follows:

KT_ timing= COVEFMBt-1=

3.4.2

(

)

̅̅̅

(3.5)

Decomposing Market-to-Book ratio Based on Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and
Viswanathan (2005)

To address the concern that the history of concurrent increases in external financing needs
and the market to book ratio are possibly affected by underlying firm characteristics rather than
by market timing activity, I further construct my third measure of market timing based on the
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan’ (RKRV) (2005) market-to-book decomposition
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technique. This approach addresses other potential problems, in that the market to book ratio
could be affected by underlying firm characteristics rather than by market timing activity, and
the possibility of concurrent increases in external funding beyond those associated with market
timing. The RKRV’s (2005) measure decomposes the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio into
market-to-value and value-to-book components, as follows:
Ln(M/Bi,t )= mit-bit = mit -ν(θit, αjt)+ν(θit, αjt) -ν(θit, αj)+ ν(θit, αj) –bi,t (3.6)
where m and b are logarithms of the market and book value of assets, respectively, and
the subscripts, i, j, and t, denote firm, sector and time, respectively. The first component in the
decomposition (mit- ν(θit, αjt)), or firm-specific-error component (FSE), measures the different
between the firm’s market value and its fundamental value as implied by accounting multiples
θit, and industry-long run multiple αjt. The second component, ν(θit, αj,t) - ν(θit, αj), or time sector
error (TSE), is the difference between the firm’s fundamental value conditioned at time t and its
long run fundamental value implied by the sector multiples (αj), which captures time-invariant
sector specific valuation. The final component, ν(θit,αj)–bi,t, or long-run value (LRV), is the
difference between the firm’s long run value as implied by its long run multiples and its book
value. This component is intended to capture the firm’s set of investment opportunities at time t.
Technically, the RKRV’s (2005) decomposition isolates the firm specific misvaluation
from industry-wide mispricing and firm growth opportunities. As such, the firm specific-error
(FSE) component can be used as a purer proxy to capture firm misvaluation in a market timing
study. In order to capture the cumulative effects of past timing attempts due to the firm
misvaluation, I also use the external weighted average firm specific-error (FSE), but I use the
firm specific sector instead of market to book itself.
RKRV_timing=

∑

(

∑
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)

(3.7)

In my final market timing measure, I also include other RKRV’s (2005) decomposition
components as control variables in the regressions to control for spurious relation between
history and capital structure due to firm characteristics and investment prospects. This is shown
as follows. The external weighted sector misvaluation (TSE) is calculated as follows:
TSE=∑

(

∑

)

(3.8)

and the external weighted average growth opportunities (LRV) as follows:
LRV=∑

(

∑

)

(3.9)

I use exponential forms of FSE, TSE, and LRV instead of actual values to avoid negative
values for average variables. To calculate firm fundamental value and long-run value using
annual sector-average regression multiples and long-run sector average multiples (ν(θit, αjt),
ν(θit, αj)), I estimate the following model (model 3 in RKRV(2005))
mi,t =α0jt + α1jtbit +α2jtLn (NI)+ +α3jtI (<0)Ln (NI)+it + α4jtLEVit +εit, (3.10)
where LEVit is the leverage ratio, (NI)+ is the absolute value of net income and I (<0)Ln (NI)+ I is
an indicator function for negative net income observations. To obtain ν(θit, ̂ ) and ν(θit, ̂ ),
using equation (3.10), I perform calculation for each firm as follows using fitted values from
equation (3.10) above:
v(Bit,NIit, LEVit, ̂ 0jt, ̂ 1jt, ̂ 2jt, ̂ 3jt, ̂ 4jt)= ̂ 0jt + ̂ 1jt bit + ̂ 2jt Ln (NI)++ ̂ 3jt I (<0)Ln (NI)+it+ ̂ 4jt LEVit
(3.11)
And to calculate the fundamental value for the firm, I first average over time the coefficients
( ̂ jt) to obtain long-run sector multiples ( ̅ j =1/T ∑

jt

for αk=0,1,2,3,4), and then calculate (ν(θit,

αj) as follows:
v(Bit,NIit, LEVit, ̅ 1j, ̅ 2j, ̅ 3j, ̅ 4j) = ̅ 0j bit + ̅ 1j bit + ̅ 2jLn (NI)++ ̅ 3jI
(3.12)
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(<0)Ln

(NI)+it+ ̅ 4jLEVit

3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Lines of Credit and the Probability of Equity Issuance
The central issue of this study is whether lines of credit facilitate market timing and
whether misvaluation is a motive for equity offerings. This section presents the results from
logistic regressions that investigate whether lines of credit foster equity issuance during the
periods of misevaluation. I model the likelihood of issuing equity in a given year during the
sample period as a function of firms’ market-to-book ratio (MB) in model 1 (equation 3.13A); or
firm specific error (FSE), time series sector error (TSE), and long run value to book (LRV) in
model 2 (equation 3.13A); or capital expenditures (CAPEX), tangible assets (PPE), 12-month
prior cumulative market adjusted returns (Pre_return), profitability (EBITDA), lines of credit
dummy variable (Linedummy), financing deficit (Deficit), leverage ratio (Leverage), firm size
(Size) in model . The logistic regression specification is as follows:
Pr (Equity issuance decision =Yes) =

(3.13)

Where u=β0 + β1 (Linedummy)+β2MB+ β3Pre_return+ β4Leverage+ β5Deficit
+β6Profitability +β7Size + β8CAPEX + ε,

(model 1)

(3.13A)

And, u=β0 + β1 (Linedummy)+ β2FSE + β3TSE+ β4LRV + β5Pre_return+ β6Leverage
+β7Deficit + β8Profitability+ β9Size+ β10CAPEX +ε,

(model 2)

(3.13B)

The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable (Seodummy) for which new equity
offerings in a given year during the sample period equal 1 and zero otherwise.
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Table 3.2 Logistics Regression Analysis
Logistic regression analysis of the seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) decision as a function of firm’s market to book
(M/B) ratio (model 1), firm specific error (TSE), Long run misvaluation (LRV), Time-series error (TSE) (model 2),
lines of credit dummy, and other control variables including size, capital expenditures (CAPEX), financial leverage,
financing deficit, tangible assets, pre-SEO market adjusted returns (Pre_return) over the 12 months ending
immediately before the year of SEOs, profitability. Independent variables are lagged one year before the SEO year.
Two marginal effects at the means (medians) are reported to the right of the estimates.
Model (1)

Intercept

(1)
-3.0851***

Marginal effect
(%)
At the
medians
-

Model (2)

At the
means
-

(-15.82)
LineDummy

0.2838**

0.1305***

At the
medians
-

Standard
Deviation

At the
means
-

(-13.51)
1.83

2.21

(1.98)
MB

(2)
-3.2836***

Marginal effect
(%)

0.2847**

1.95

2.09

0.4997

(1.96)
4.31

4.61

3.0436

(5.88)
0.7547***

FSE

8.07

3.12

0.2794

7.13

5.44

0.4573

1.90

0.51

0.2130

5.59

3.99

0.7891

3.63

2.44

0.3719

2.75

2.63

0.7361

3.60

3.44

0.3211

-1.70

-0.93

3.1665

0.18

0.17

0.0729

(6.71)
0.7981***

LRV

(4.66)
0.1616

TSE

(0.57)
0.3142***

4.60

4.91

0.3415***

Pre_Return
(6.69)
Leverage

(4.86)

0.4941

2.89

(2.96)

2.71

Deficit

0.1662

1.79

Profitability

(0.91)
0.4948

(2.53)
1.92

-0.0223

2.33

2.49

0.3325

0.7238
(1.67)

-1.03

-1.12

(-0.94)
CAPEX

0.2419
(1.35)

(1.12)
Size

0.4445***

-0.0200
(-0.80)

0.35

0.38

(0.39)

0.1629
(0.18)
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Table 3.2 presents the logistic regression results. I capture the overvaluation by using
market-to book ratio (MB) in model 1 (Equation 3.13A) and firm specific error (TSE) in model 2
(Equation 3.13B). Consistent with prior literature, the coefficients on MB, FSE, Pre_return,
Leverage, and Deficit are all positive and statistically significant at 1 percent, suggesting that
firms with high market to book ratio or high level of misvaluation, high leverage ratio, high level
of financing deficit, and high cumulative returns prior to SEOs are more likely to issue equity.
The magnitudes and signs of the coefficients on a set of control variables in both model 2 are
very similar if market-to-book ratio is replaced with the firm specific error (FSE) and other two
components of RKRV’s (2005) market-to-book decomposition (TSE and LRV).
In addition, the coefficients on line of credit dummy (0.2838, t-value=1.98, and 0.2847, tvalue=1.96 for model 1 and 2, respectively) are statistically positive in both models. The positive
coefficients indicate that firms with lines of credit are more likely to issue equity during the
sample period. Contrary to the conventional perception that firms would draw loans from lines of
credit rather than issue new equity to avoid issuing costs, the results show the market timing of
equity offerings to be more prevalent in firms with lines of credit than in those without lines of
credit.
Since the slope coefficients in the logistic regression model represent change in logit
corresponding to a change of one unit in the independent variable, it is hard to draw practical
inferences from the estimated coefficients in the model. To facilitate interpretation, I also
calculate the marginal effects (marginal effects at the mean and at the median) to show the
magnitude of each explanatory variable’s contribution to the probability of issuing equity for the
sample firms. For dummy variable, taking Linedummy for example, marginal effect is a measure
of the instantaneous effect that a change in line of credit (from zero (no lines of credit) to one
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(with lines of credit)) has on the predicted probability of issuing new equity, when the other
explanatory variables are kept fixed at their sample median or mean levels. For other continuous
variables, the marginal effect, taking FSE for example, at the medians (means) is the difference
between two probabilities, given one standard deviation change in FSE while other variables are
kept fixed at their medians (means).
I present the marginal effects (in percentage) in the columns right next to the regular
logistic coefficient columns by moving the value of variable of interest from one-half standard
deviation below its median (mean) to on-half standard deviation above its median (mean) while
other variables are kept fixed at their medians (means). In Table 3.2, one standard deviation
change in market-to-book firm specific error variable (FSE) increases the probability of issuing
equity about 8.07 percent (at the medians). Given the standard deviation of FSE is 0.2794, firm
specific misvaluation has a large impact on the decision of equity offerings. Similarly, the
marginal effects of line of credit dummy (Linedummy) at the mean are respectively 2.21% and
2.09% for model 1 and 2, suggesting that the probability of issuing equity in a given year during
the sample period is about two percent higher for firms with lines of credit. The results reveal
another important determinant of equity issuance. That is, firms having lines of credit are more
likely to issue equity, possibly due to market timing behavior rather than the needs for external
financing. I further investigate this issue in the following sections.
3.5.2 Misvaluation, Lines of Credit, and Market Timing
I first consider the impact of market conditions and misvaluation on capital structure and
how lines of credit affect their relationship. The issue of interest is whether accessing lines of
credit fosters market timing behavior and is a significant factor affecting a firm’s capital
structure after controlling for other firm characteristics. I use Baker and Wurgler (2002) and
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Kayhan and Titman’s (2007) measures in my first test to examine the roles of lines of credit in
facilitating market timing. Specifically, I run the following regressions (Equation 3.14) that
control for other determinants of leverage and industry fixed effects.
MLi,t= β0+ β1Linedummyit + β2Linedummy*Marketimingi,t+ β3Markettimingi,t +β4MBi,t
+β5Tangibilityi,t+β6Profitabilityi,t +β7 Sizei,t +∑

+εi,t

(3.14)

The dependent variable is market leverage ratio (ML). The explanatory variables include
dummy variable for lines of credit (Linedummy), marketing timing variable, the interaction
between the dummy variable and market timing variable (Linedummy*Markettiming), and other
control variables widely adopted in capital structure literature. Specifically, I employ a set of
control variables as proposed in Rajan and Zingales (1995). I then construct a set of control
variables following Baker and Wurgler (2002) as follows. The market-to-book ratio (MB) is
defined as total assets minus book equity plus market equity, divided by total assets. Tangibility
is defined as net plant, property and equipment, divided by total assets. Profitability is defined as
earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, divided by total assets. Size is defined as log of
net sales. Market leverage (ML) is book debt divided by the result of total assets minus book
equity plus market equity (in percentage term). Market timing variables include Baker and
Wurgler’s( 2002)(MBEFWAt-1) and Kayhan and Titman’s (2007) (COVEFMBt-1) measures as
discussed in the previous section. I also include a set of dummy variables to control for industry
effects.
Based on my hypotheses, I predict the coefficients on market timing and the interaction
between market timing and lines of credit dummy variable are both negative, if the capital
structures of the sample firms are affected by market timing. The coefficient on the interaction
term (Linedummy*Markettiming) shows the impact of lines of credit on market timing, given the
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firms’ market timing implementation. The negative coefficient indicates that firms with lines of
credit are more active in exploiting their misvaluations by issuing equity during the sample
period. I also expect the coefficients on other control variables to be consistent with prior
literature. For example, Frank and Goyal (2003) and Alti (2006) find the positive relation
between asset tangibility, firm size, and negative relation between profitability, market-to-book
and leverage.
Table 3.3 shows the results based on the estimations of

equation (3.14) above.

Throughout this paper, I use the modified Fama-Macbeth (1973) procedure as proposed by
Petersen (2009) to estimate regression coefficients and standard errors. Specifically, I follow
Fama-Macbeth (1973) procedure but correct the standard errors of the estimated coefficients for
heteroskedasticity and the clustering of observation by both firm and period. As discussed in
Peterson (2009), the issues of serial correlation and cross-correlation of error terms often arise in
panel data sets, typically in repeated observations on the same or a substantially overlapping, set
of firms over time like the one in this study. If cross sectional and time series dependence is
presence in the sample, then cluster robust standard errors are well specified and more
appropriate. The first two columns show the results for the pooled sample using MBEFWAt-1 and
COVEFMBt-1 measures as the variables of interests. The coefficients on Markettiming and the
interaction term (Markettiming*Linedummy) are -1.07 and -3.30 for MBEFWAt-1 and -1.31 and 1.39 for COVEFMBt-1, respectively. All coefficients are statistically significant at 5 percent. The
results also show the economically significant impacts the timing variables. For example, an
increase in two standard deviations of MBEFWAt-1 and COVEFMBt-1 leads to a reduction of
approximately 8.6 % and 5.1 % in the average value of ML. the control variables all have
expected signs and statistically significant at 5 percent.
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Table 3.3 The Effects of Lines of Credit on Market Timing Using BW and KT Timing Measures
with KZ index
The dependent variable is market leverage (ML), which is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to the market value
of assets. The independent variables include market timing variable (Baker-Wurgler (2002) market to book external
financing variable-MBEFWAt-1 (model 1), and Kayhan-Titman (2007)-COVEFMB (model 2), line of credit dummy,
the interaction between BW_timing variable and line of credit dummy, market to book, four Kaplan and Zingales’
(1995) control variables (tangibility, profitability, size), and industries dummies based on Fama and French 12
industry classification. Firms are sorted into constrained and non-constrained sample groups based Kapland and
Zingales’ (1995) index (KZ index). The coefficients and t-values are obtained from the modified Fama-MacBeth
regressions, corrected for heteroskedasticity and the clustering of observations by both firm and period.
Model

(1) Pooled sample

MarketTiming

MarketTiming*
LineDummy

LineDummy

Market-tobook

Tangibility

Profitability

Size

Industry
Dummy

(2) Non-constrained
(Based on KZ index)

(3) Constrained
(Based on KZ index)

BW_Timing

KT_Timing

BW_Timing

KT_Timing

BW_Timing

KT_Timing

-1.8740***

-0.8166***

-0.9868***

-0.4886**

-4.3773***

-0.9927

(-3.36)

(-2.69)

(-5.04)

(-2.02)

(-3.9268)

(-0.77)

-1.0783***

-1.3073**

-2.2826***

-1.6179***

1.7768**

0.1033

(-3.59)

(-1.98)

(-4.98)

(-2.88)

(2.58)

(0.06)

3.3069**

1.3975*

6.7848***

2.7263***

-6.0466***

-1.768

(2.67)

(1.92)

(8.18)

(2.71)

(-3.18)

(-1.07)

-3.8907***

-2.3981**

-3.1522***

-1.7809***

-4.7245***

-3.5705***

(-10.79)

(-4.13)

(-4.95)

(-3.50)

(-9.82)

(-6.23)

0.2159***

0.1051***

0.2206***

0.1191***

0.0433**

0.0559

(8.52)

(3.82)

(13.23)

(3.95)

(2.61)

(1.09)

-0.0938***

-0.1047***

-0.1157***

-0.0983***

-0.0532

-0.0616

(-3.80)

(-3.47)

(-5.75)

(-3.42)

(-1.11)

(-1.33)

0.7184**

0.3396**

0.5418

0.3211

0.4280

1.1169***

(2.37)

(2.06)

(1.47)

(1.48)

(0.87)

(3.53)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Next, I examine whether the effects of the lines of credit on market timing are more
pronounced for unconstrained firms. Four right-most columns of Table 3.3 shows results for two
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subsamples, namely unconstrained and constrained samples. I sort firms into constrained and
non-constrained samples using the Kaplan and Zingales’ (KZ) index of constraints. The KZ
index is a linear combination of five variables: debt to total capital (positive relationship),
dividends to capital (negative relationship), cash holdings to capital (negative relationship), cash
ﬂow to capital (negative relationship), and Tobin’s Q (positive relationship) (Equation 3.15).
More constrained firms have a higher KZ index and vice versa. More specifically, I follow
Lamont et al., (2001) to construct KZ index as follows:
KZ Index = -1.002 x (Cash Flows / K) + 0.283x Q + 3.139x (Debt / Total Capital)
-39.368 x (Dividends / K) -1.315 x (Cash / K)5

(3.15)

I report coefficients of market timing and other control variable for non-constrained
sample in the two columns in the middle of Table 3.3. The signs of the coefficients obtained
from the unconstrained sample are similar to those of coefficients obtained from the pooled
sample, suggesting the same effects of lines of credit on market timing. For example, the
coefficients

on

timing

variable

(MBEFWAt-1)

and

the

interaction

term

(MarketTiming*LineDummy) are -0.9868 (-0.4886) and -2.2826 (-1.6179), respectively.
Interestingly, I find no such pattern on coefficients of timing variables and interactional terms
between timing variable and the indicator for lines of credit in the constrained sample. While the
signs of coefficient on timing variables are still negative, the signs of interaction between
dummy

variable

for

lines

of

credit

and

two

measures

of

market

timing

(MarketTiming*LineDummy) are positive and significant at 1 percent for Baker and Wurgler’s

5 I directly use the same variable definitions from Lamont et al., (2001) to construct KZ index. Cash flow is defined
as operating income plus depreciation (Compustat item 18 + item 14). Tobin’s Q is defined as book assets minus
book common equity minus deferred taxes plus market equity) / book assets calculated as [item 6 − item 60 − item
74 + (item 25 × item 24)] / item 6. Debt is defined as short-term plus long-term debt (item 9 + item 34). Total capital
is defined as debt plus total stockholders’ equity (item 9 + item 34 + item 216).
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(2002) measure (MBEFWAt-1) and 10 percent for Kayhan and Titman’s (2007) measure
(COVEFMBt-1). This indicates that financially constrained firms find it difficult to employ
market timing strategies even with lines of credit. The right most column of Table 3.3 offers no
evidence that financial constrained firms are not able to timing the market. These results provide
support for my argument that it is difficult enough for constrained firms to raise external capital,
let alone time the market.
I reach similar conclusions when I use a different proxy for financial constraints. Table
3.4 also reports the results using the Altman Z-score6 and the Ohlson O-score7 to sort firms into
the financially constrained and non-constrained samples. All coefficients for timing variables and
interaction between timing variable and the indicator for lines of credit are negative and
statistically significant at 5 percent for pooled sample and non-constrained sample. Similarly, the
results for unconstrained sample by using different sorting criteria indicate there are no effects of
lines of credit on market timing.

6 The Altman Z-Score is a measure of a company’s health and likelihood of bankruptcy based on Altman (1968).

The Z-score is constructed as follows: Z = 1.2*(WC/TA) + 1.4*(RE/TA) + 3.3*(EBITDA/TA) + 0.6*(ME/TL) +
1.0* (Sales/TA). WC is defined as working capital. TA is total assets. RE is retained earnings. EBITDA is earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. ME is market equity. TL is total liabilities. Firms with Z-Score
< 1.81 are sorted into constrained sample, while firms with Z-Score >3.0 are sorted into non-constrained sample.
7 I follow Ohlson (1980) to construct O-Score as follows:

O-Score= -1.32-0.407*Size+6.03*TLTA-1.432*WCTA+0.076*CLCA-1.72*OENEG-2.37*NITA-1.83*FFOLT
+0.285*INTWO-0.521*CHIN. Size or market assets are defined as market total liabilities plus market equity (price
times shares outstanding) divided by consumer price index (CPI). TLTA is defineds as the book value of debt
divided by market assets.WCTA is working capital divided by market assets. CLCA is current liability divided by
current assets. ONENEG is one if total liabilities exeeds total assets and is zero otherwise. NITA is net income
divided by assets. FFOLT is the funds from operations divided by liability. INTWO is equal to one if net income is
negative for the last two years and zero otherwise. CHIN is defined as (NI-NIt-1)/(absolute(NI)+absolute (NIt-1),
where NIi is net income for the most recent quarter.

65

Table 3.4 The Effects of Lines of Credit on Market Timing Using BW and KT Timing Measures with Atman Z-Score
and Ohlson’s O-Score
Firms are sorted into constrained and non-constrained groups based on Atman’s Z-score and Ohlson’s (1980) O-score. The dependent variable is market leverage
(ML), which is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of assets. The independent variables include MBEFWAt-1 and COVEFMBt-1, line of credit
dummy, the interaction between timing variable and line of credit dummy, market to book, four Kaplan and Zingales’ (1995) control variables (tangibility,
profitability, size), and industries dummies based on Fama and French 12 industry classification. The independent variables, except for market to book ratio, are
scaled by total assets and lagged one period relative to the dependent variables. The coefficients and t-values are obtained from the modified Fama-MacBeth
regressions, corrected for heteroskedasticity and the clustering of observations by both firms and period.
Model

MarketTiming

MarketTiming*
LineDummy
LineDummy

Market-to-book

Tangibility

Profitability

Size

2

Adj. R

Non-constrained
Altman's Z-score

Constrained
Altman's Z-score

Non-constrained
Ohlson’s O-score

Constrained
Ohlson’s O-score

BW_Timing

KT_Timing

BW_Timing

KT_Timing

BW_Timing

KT_Timing

BW_Timing

KT_Timing

-0.7123***

-0.7937**

-3.1596***

-1.2778

-0.4376**

-0.1356

-3.1657***

-2.6272**

(-6.48)

(-2.41)

(-7.82)

(-1.08)

(-2.36)

(-0.38))

(-5.03)

(-2.49)

-2.7155***

-1.0090**

0.5634

1.2080

-2.5620***

-2.4263***

0.7107

1.4411

(-6.91)

(-2.15)

(1.64)

(0.82)

(-5.21)

(-2.25)

(1.44)

(0.88)

12.0713***

2.6014**

-5.1107***

-3.9051**

11.6545***

4.8870***

-1.6256

0.2638

(4.57)

(2.45)

(-2.75)

(-2.87)

(4.49)

(3.19)

(-0.86)

(0.11)

-3.0974***

-2.4440***

-2.6637**

-3.0878***

-3.7540***

-2.9197***

-3.2564***

-3.4302***

(-11.20)

(-4.27)

(-2.56)

(-3.17)

(-10.43)

(-4.85)

(-5.23)

(-6.25)

0.0221***

0.0181**

0.0958**

0.0783**

0.1141***

0.0776***

0.1507***

0.1277***

(2.99)

(2.19)

(2.97)

(2.48)

(5.60)

(4.04)

(12.90)

(4.02)

-0.1412***

-0.1000***

0.0466

0.0423

-0.0920***

-0.0956***

-0.0093

-0.0033

(-5.70)

(-3.65)

(0.92)

(0.93)

(-3.81)

(-2.88)

(-0.35)

(-0.11)

2.1455***

1.1861***

0.7041

0.6227

1.6616**

0.8688**

0.6038

-0.0514

(7.03)

(3.50)

(1.44)

(1.54)

(2.19)

(2.26)

(0.55)

(-0.07)

0.4645

0.4982

0.3491

0.3279

0.4100

0.3901

0.4784

0.4659
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Table 3.5 The Effects of Lines of Credit on Market Timing: Using RKRV’s (2005) Timing
Measure with KZ index
The dependent variable is market leverage (ML), which is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to the market value
of assets. The independent variables include market timing variable (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan’s
(2005) firm specific error (FSE), which capture stock misvaluation), line of credit dummy, the interaction between
FSE timing variable and line of credit dummy, market to book, Kaplan and Zingales’ (1995) control variables
(tangibility, profitability, size), and industries dummies based on Fama and French 12 industry classification. The
independent variables, except for market to book ratio, are scaled by total assets and lagged one period relative to
the dependent variables. The coefficients and t-values are obtained from the modified Fama-MacBeth regressions,
corrected for heteroskedasticity and the clustering of observations by both firm and period.
Model

Pooled sample

MarketTiming (EFWA_FSEt-1)

-2.6166**

-2.6496**

8.3495**

(-2.22)

(2.32)

(2.48)

-3.8939***

-5.9721***

0.5787

(-3.34)

(-4.43)

(0.17)

1.5103

2.8692***

-0.0035

(1.97)*

(4.22)

(-0.00)

-1.5887***

-1.7620***

-3.1689***

(-6.80)

(-6.14)

(-5.85)

0.3078***

0.1645***

0.0204

(30.12)

(11.23)

(0.57)

-0.1426***

-0.1656***

-0.1477***

(17.09)

(19.86)

(-3.44)

0.5676

0.4882

-0.8939

(-1.58)

(-0.90)

(-1.04)

-8.3154

-6.8834

-31.795

(-0.54)

(-0.49)

(-1.10)

-51.037***

-45.935

-47.679***

(-27.02)

(-27.60)

(-9.47)

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.5407

0.5403

0.5650

MarketTiming*LineDummy

LineDummy

Market-to-book (MBt)

Tangibility (PPEt-1)

Profitability (EBITDAt-1)

Sizet-1 (Ln(sale))

TSE (Time Series Sector Error)

LRV(Long-run Value to Book)

Industry Dummy
Adj. R2
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Non-Constrained
(Based on KZ index)

Constrained
(Based on KZ index)

The coefficients on interaction terms between timing and dummy for lines of credit
variables are positive and not statistically significant. Regardless of sorting criteria there is no
support for the market timing.
Thus far, I demonstrate an empirical relation regarding the role of lines of credit in
fostering market timing. I have also provided several analyses of corroborating evidence in
support of the hypothesis that financially constrained firms are not able to time the market even
when they have access to lines of credit, or committed loans. To shed more light on the roles of
credit lines in facilitating market timing, I expand my analyses by using the third market timing
measure, which is based on RKRV’s (2005) decomposition of market-to-book.
Table 3.5 reports the results of the regressions with external finance weighted average
firm specific error (FSE) as my timing measure and external finance weighted average time
series sector (TSE), external finance weighted average long-run value to book (LRV) as two
additional explanatory variables. I use KZ index to sort firms into constrained and nonconstrained samples. As usual, I am interested in coefficients on timing variable and the
interaction term between the timing variable and the dummy for credit lines. Consistent with
prior results, coefficients on timing variables and the interaction terms are both negative and
statistically significant at 1 percent for the pooled sample and the non-constrained sample. For
the constrained sample, I do not find any evidence of market timing since the coefficient estimate
of timing variable (EFWA_FSE) and the interaction term (Markettiming*Linedummy) are 8.3495
(t-statistic=2.48) and 0.578 (t-statistic=0.17), respectively. The positive signs of both coefficients
indicate that constrained firms possibly have no scope for market timing, given their limited
flexibility in raising external financing. Another explanation can be found in the survey of
Campello et al. (2011). That is, financially constrained firms with low internal resources are
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more likely to preemptively draw on their lines of credit because they are most likely to be
rationed when their lenders have their own problems. Consequently, constrained firms exhaust
their credit lines faster than non-constrained firms. If so, constrained firms are not able to engage
in market timing by temporarily draw down the funds from credit lines. In other words,
constrained firms that either preemptively draw on lines of credit to avoid credit rationing or
exhaust their credit lines due to liquidity shocks are not able to time their equity even they can
identify “windows of opportunity”.
Table 3.6 reports the regression results using EFWA_FSE as timing variable and
Altman’s Z-Score and Ohlson’s O-Score to sort firms into two subsamples, constrained and nonconstrained. Again, I observe that the estimated coefficients of the variables of interest are
indeed similar to those in Table 3.5. Although the coefficient on market timing variable for the
non-constrained sample using O-score sorting criteria market is negative while the coefficient on
the interaction terms between market timing and the dummy for credit lines is positive. This
suggests that the presence of credit lines does not affect market timing for constrained firms.
Overall, results reported across all tables using different measures for market timing and
financial constraints provide evidence of market timing such that firms issue equity when equity
prices are high and issue debt when equity prices are low. In addition, market timing activity
could be amplified with the presence of lines of credit. I find that accessing to credit lines allows
non-constrained firms to actively engage in market timing, thus possibly creating more value to
such firms. However, I could not found any effects of lines of credit on market timing in the
constrained sample. The findings are robust to different sorting criteria including KZ-index,
Altman’s Z-Score, and Ohlson’s O-Score.
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Table 3.6 The Effects of Lines of Credit on Market Timing: Using RKRV Timing Measure with
Altman Z-score and Ohlson O-score.
The dependent variable is market leverage (ML), which is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to the market value
of assets. The independent variables include market timing variable (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan’s
(2005) firm specific error (FSE), which capture stock misvaluation), line of credit dummy, the interaction between
FSE timing variable and line of credit dummy, market to book, Kaplan and Zingales’ (1995) control variables
(tangibility, profitability, size), and industries dummies based on Fama and French 12 industry classification. The
coefficients and t-values are obtained from the modified Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions, corrected for
heteroskedasticity and the clustering of observations by both firm and period.
Altman's Z-score

MarketTiming

MarketTiming*LineDummy

LineDummy

Market-to-book

Tangibility

Profitability

Sector Error

Long-run Misvaluation

Size

Ohlson O-score

Pooled

Non-

Constrained

Non-

Constrained

Sample

constrained

Sample

constrained

Sample

-2.6166**

-1.4637
**
sample

4.4879

-3.983
**
Sample

-7.1730

(-2.22)

(-2.33)

(0.95)

(2.70)

(-3.51)

-3.8939***

-10.093***

-1.2127

-10.190***

11.6984***

(-3.34)

(-4.69)

(-0.23)

(-8.19)

(3.41)

1.5103*

5.6811***

-2.0351

7.0504***

-3.2083*

(1.97)

(3.11)

(-1.07)

(12.43)

(-2.02)

-1.5887***

-2.0683***

-2.8840*

-2.6028***

-2.1487**

(-6.80)

(-40.42)

(-2.25)

(-18.21)

(2.68)

0.3078***

0.0326*

0.0737*

0.0924**

0.1550***

(30.12)

(2.05)

(2.01)

(2.76)

(7.35)

-0.1426***

-0.1357***

-0.0605

-0.1180***

-0.0732**

(17.09)

(-7.28)

(-1.75)

(-3.35)

(-2.98)

0.5676

-0.2032

-15.924

0.6806

-25.188

(-1.58)

(-0.01)

(-0.69)

(0.06)

(-1.28)

-8.3154

-32.765***

-41.627***

-33.396***

-45.265***

(-0.54)

(-11.43)

(8.28)

(-13.25)

(-7.76)

-51.037***

0.7301*

-0.0121

-0.0082

-1.5910

(-27.012)

(1.93)

(-0.02)

(-0.01)

(-1.22)
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3.5.3 Lines of Credit and the Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offerings
Several studies have documented significant undepricing in seasoned equity offerings
(e.g., Corwin (2003, Mola and Loughan (2004)). SEO underpricing occurs when the offer price
is lower than the closing price on the day prior to the offer date. Scholars have developed several
theories to explain the underpricing of SEOs. For example, information asymmetry theory (e.g.,
Myers and Majluf (1984)) explains that managers are tempted to mislead outside investors by
issuing equity when their stocks are overvalued. Anticipating such a tactic, outside investors will
discount the prices they are willing to pay for the firms’ new shares. Thus, higher level of
information asymmetry should lead to higher the level of SEO underpricing (discount). Another
explanation is that underwriters have an incentive to leave money on the table for outside
investors during SEOs in order to get the job done, thus enjoying high reputation and recognition
from customers. Prior empirical studies document that the major determinants of SEO
underpricing include the level of information asymmetry, the level of uncertainty about firm
value, underwriter reputation, relative offer size, and conventional underwriter pricing practices
(Altinkilic and Hansen, 2002; Corwin 2003).
If lines of credit help firms to delay their equity offerings until suitable market conditions
appear, they would help firms to push up their offer prices during “windows of opportunity”
periods. As such, firms may experience a lower degree of underpricing through SEO episodes. In
this section I analyze the effects of lines of credit on SEO underpricing. My hypothesis is that
firms accessing lines of credit are more likely to experience a lower degree of SEO underpricing.
To test this hypothesis, I use the following regression specification (Equation 3.16):
Underpricing = β0 + β1Linedummy+β2Precar+β3IPOUnderpricing +β4Volatility
+β5Offersize +β6Rank+β7Tick+ β8Size+ β9NASDAQ+ε,
72

(3.16)

The dependent variable is Underpricing, defined as the closing price on the offer day
minus the offer price, divided by the offer price. I also use the second proxy for Underpricing,
namely Discount for my regressions. Discount is the closing price on the day prior to the offer
minus the offer price, divided by the closing price on the day prior to the offer. Along with my
variable of interest, Linedummy, I also include a set of explanatory variables that are widely
adopted in the literature. First, Volatility variable, proxied for stock price uncertainty, is defined
as the standard deviation of stock returns over the period of 30 trading days ending 10 days prior
to the offer date. I expect a positive coefficient on Volatility since Corwin (2003) finds higher
return volatility is associated with higher levels of underpricing. Second, PreCar variable,
proxied for pre-offer price run up, is defined as the cumulative adjusted returns over the period
of 5 trading days prior to the offer. I expect a positive coefficient on PreCar since the literature
on SEO underpricing (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (2002)) has documented that the equity issuers
are more tolerant of excessive underpricing if they simultaneously learn about a post market
valuation that is higher than what they expected. Therefore, issuers who see greater recent
increases in their stock price have the edge over their contracted underwriters in setting the offer
prices. This also implies that pre-offer abnormal stock returns are positively related to the
magnitude of the SEO underpricing.
In addition, I follow Corwin (2003) to control for the effects of price pressure with the
variable Offersize, calculated as shares offered divided by the total number of shares outstanding
prior to the offer. I also include Tick, which is a dummy variable equals to one if the decimal
portion of the closing price on the day prior to the offer is less than $0.25, and zero otherwise, to
reflect the effects of rounded prices on SEO underpricing. Other control variables include
IPOUnderpricing, measured as the average underprcing across all IPOs during the same month
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as the SEO, and NASDAQ dummy variable that equals one if the issuers are listed on NASDAQ,
and zero if on NYSE or AMEX at the time of offer. Finally, I use Rank to control for quality of
underwriters. I obtain information on underwriters’ ranking for the lead underwriter for each
SEO in the sample from Jay Ritter’s website (http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/).
Table 3.7 reports the results from univariate and multivariate tests of the effects of lines
of credit on SEO undepricing. Panel A table 3.7 shows that both mean and median levels of
issuers with lines of credit are much smaller than those of issuers without lines of credit.
Specifically, the mean Underpricing (Discount) of issuers without lines of credit are 0.0435
(0.044), while the mean Underpricing (Discount) of issuers with lines of credit are 0.029
(0.0288). The difference between the means of two samples is statistically significant at 1
percent. With regard to multivariate analysis, Table 3.7 panel B provides strong evidence to
support my hypothesis. The coefficients on Linedummy, -0.0072 (t=1.98) for Underpricing and
-0.0069 (t-statistics=2.97) of Discount, are negative and statistically significant at 5 percent,
suggesting that lines of credit allow issuers to time their offerings to get more favorable offer
prices.
Other control variables are consistent with prior studies. For example, the signs of
PreCar, Volatility, and Offersize are all positive and statistically significant. SEO underpricing
increases with volatility of stock returns prior to SEOs, relative offer size, and pre-offer
abnormal returns. The negative coefficients on Rank suggest that SEO underpricing decreases
with underwriters’ reputation. Also, issuers listed on NASDAD stock exchange experience
higher levels of SEO underpricing.
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Table 3.7 The Effects of Lines of Credit on SEO Underpricing
Panel A presents t-test analysis of the effects of line of credit on SEO underpricing. Panel B lists coefficients (tvalues) from OLS regressions of SEO underpricing (SEO discount) on line of credit dummy and a set of control
variables. P-values are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Note: *, **, and ***
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: the t-Test Analysis
Mean (SEO Underpricing)

Mean (SEO Discount)

Group 1 (147 firms without lines of credit)

0.0435

0.0441

Group 2 (816 firms with lines of credit)

0.0291

0.0288

Difference (Group 2-Group 1)

-0.0144***

-0.0153***

t-value

(3.40)

(4.76)

Model

SEO Underpricing

SEO Discount

Intercept

0.0442***

0.0568***

(4.10)

(7.51)

-0.0072**

-0.0069***

(-1.98)

(-2.67)

0.2459***

0.0986***

(19.55)

(10.96)

-0.0121**

-0.0132

(-2.17)

(-3.27)

-0.0037***

-0.0052***

(-3.34)

(-6.40)

0.7023***

0.3791***

(7.90)

(5.90)

0.0306***

0.0141***

(3.73)

(2.97)

-00056**

0.0005

(-2.02)

(0.26)

0.005**

0.0011

(1.96)

(0.44)

0.3427

0.2511

Panel B: Multivariate Analysis

LineDummy

PreCar

IPOUnderpricing

Rank

Volatility

Offersize

Tick

Nasdaq

Adj. R2
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3.6 Robustness
To examine the evolution of the capital structure over time, I conduct robustness tests by
creating propensity matched pair samples8. The matching of firms with credit lines with firms
without credit lines provides a testable sample that mitigates the bias in my previous tests due to
sample selection bias. Specifically, I match 75 randomly selected firms in the non-credit line
sample with 75 firms in the credit line sample on the basis of their propensity score in their IPO
years, which is a measure of the firm’s propensity to have a line of credit based on the firm’s
characteristics (ROA, Size, Z-Score, and Leverage). I simply choose a single, “nearest neighbor”
match without replacement. I conduct matched-pairs t-tests to examine whether firms with lines
of credit have more net equity and debt issues over years than those without lines of credit. Also,
I investigate whether firms without lines of credit are more likely to experience a lower degree of
SEO underpricing for their equity offerings. To save space, I do not report the results here. The
results based on matched sample analyses confirm my previous findings. That is, firms accessing
lines of credit are more likely to engage in market timing (more net debt and equity issues) and
experience a lower degree of SEO underpricing.
3.7 Conclusion
This study examines the impact of lines of credit on market timing. I argue that a firm
with an accession to a line of credit is more likely to actively time the equity market since lines
of credit, though not perfect substitutes for cash holdings in liquidity management, allow firms to
delay offerings until market conditions become favorable, thereby creating more value for
current shareholders. I test this hypothesis by using both logistic and OLS regressions with
modified Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation procedures, corrected for heteroskedasticity and

8

The seminal paper in the matching literature is Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
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clustering of observations by both firms and time periods. I find strong support for my prediction
that lines of credit foster market timing, especially for non-constrained firms. In contrast, I do not
find support for my argument in the financially constrained sample firms.
I also examine whether lines of credit help firms to lower their level of SEO underpricing
when they engage in equity offerings. I expect issuing firms with lines of credit to have better
offer prices if lines of credit allow them to time the markets. My findings again support the
argument that lines of credit lines allow firms to engage in market timing, with less associated
SEO underpricing, thereby creating more value to the issuing firms. Overall, these findings shed
new light on how lines of credit can create more value to a firm through the market timing
channel.
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Chapter 4
The Effects of Covenant Violations on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital and
the Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offerings

4.1 Introduction
A growing body of literature on the effects of covenant violation shows that creditors
play a significant role in the corporate governance of firms in technical defaults. For example,
prior studies (Chen and Wei, 1993; Sweeney, 1994; Robert and Sufi, 2009, Nini, Smith, and
Sufi, 2012) provide evidence that violating covenants is costly for the borrowing firm because
the borrowing firm is more likely to pay higher costs for their subsequent loans and to experience
other costly concessions such as under investment costs resulting from future capital expenditure
restrictions set forth in the amended loan contracts after re-negotiations. For instance, Nini,
Smith, and Sufi (2012) find that investment spending is significantly reduced after covenant
violations and Robert and Sufi (2000) find that covenant violations are associated with a lower
level of debt issuance and lower financial leverage. In addition, violating firms are more likely to
have poor credit ratings, thus resulting in a lower borrowing capacity and higher financing costs.
Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) also show that while covenant violations rarely lead to bankruptcy
or liquidation, they generally lead to amended agreements with higher interest rates, shorter
maturity, and less funding compared with agreements prior to violations. Also, amended
agreements are likely to contain more restrictions on cash management and to require collateral.
Prior empirical studies have mainly focused on the costs of covenant violations regarding
agency cost of debts such as underinvestment costs and higher cost of debts (e.g., Dichev and
Skinner (2002); Beneish and Press (1993)). Although some studies generally show the effects of
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violations on the costs of borrowing in terms of higher interest rates and lower borrowing
capacity, they do not quantify the effects of covenant violations on the cost of equity, especially
the direct costs of equity, or SEO underpricing, through post violation SEO episodes of violating
firms. This paper contributes to the current literature by extending earlier studies that investigate
the direct impact of covenant violation on firm value. More specifically, this study examines and
quantifies the effects of covenant violations on the implied cost of equity capital based on
increasing perceived risks. It is widely known that the cost of debt is positively correlated with
the cost of equity if firms become riskier after covenant violations. Investors in higher risk firms
would require higher required returns, so the cost of equity goes up when firm risk increases.
Therefore, in this study I investigate the effects of covenant violations on the cost of equity after
controlling for the levels of financial risks.
One might argue that an increase in the cost of equity after a covenant violation is mainly
attributed to the change in operating risks due to performance deterioration prior to the
violations. It should be noted, however, that violating firms are not necessarily higher operating
risk firms than non-violating ones since violations depend not only on performance deterioration
but also on the covenants’ strictness. Borrowers that expect to stay in covenant compliance by
having a better future performance or having fewer risk shifting opportunities may prefer
contracts that provide lenders with strong control rights via tight covenants in exchange for more
favorable loan terms (Garleanu and Zwiebel, 2009). Hence, firms are more likely to violate
covenants if they chose on an ex-ante basis tight covenants for more favorable loan terms even
when their performance is generally better than average. For example, Demiroglu and James
(2012) show that despite the average improvements both in covenant variables and other
performance measures, firms with tight covenants are more likely to violate their covenants.
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The increase in the cost of equity capital following a violation could be caused by higher
perceived risk resulting from market reactions to the violation as well as by higher financial risk
outcomes materially resulting from higher leverage/higher probability of bankruptcy. To
disentangle the effects of covenant violation announcements on the cost of equity capital based
on the market’s reactions (analysts’ earnings estimate revisions) to violation announcements, I
test whether the change in the implied cost of equity capital observed surrounding covenant
violations is statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of control variables for a sample
of violating firms by using difference-in-difference and discontinuity regression approach.
Specifically, I investigate the change in the cost of equity capital due to higher perceived risk
rather than the actual outcomes caused by creditor intervention by comparing the ex-ante cost of
equity implied in analysis earnings forecasts and stock prices before and after violations. I
measure the post violation implied cost of equity for violating firms based on stock analyst
revisions after the violation announcements.
Using a sample of 1,028 first-time covenant violations from 1996-2011 of the public
firms in the United States, I find that covenant violators on average experiences a 8.48 percent
increase in the implied cost of equity capital. I perform several robustness tests using four
common models in estimating the cost of equity capital implied by analysts’ earnings forecasts,
stock prices, and accounting data. I also examine the effects of violation announcements and
quantify the change in the cost of equity given both market reactions to higher perceived risk and
possible credit interventions following violations by comparing the change in cost of equity of
violating firms with that of the benchmark sample firms that have the same level of financial
risks (leverage) before and after the violations. To find the benchmark sample, I match violating
firms to nonviolating firms based on the ex-ante likelihood of a debt covenant violation (implied
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covenant violation) prior to the violation announcements using propensity score matching
method. I also investigate the effect of covenant violations on SEO underpricing for a sample of
SEOs conducted during three year period immediately following covenant violations, with the
expectation that one penalty for violating a covenant is that subsequent SEOs suffer from greater
underpricing .
The results show that on average covenant violators experience about 3.42 percent SEO
underpricing for their new offerings following violations while non-violators generally
experience only about 2.8 percent underpricing. The difference is statistically significant. Prior
research on covenant violation has not directly measured the cost of equity capital effects. In
addition, to my current knowledge, this is the first study that directly connects covenant
violations with the cost of equity capital and SEO underpricing. The remainder of this chapter is
organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides related literature. Section 4.3 describes the sample
selection process and descriptive statistics. Section 4.4 presents four different models of the cost
of equity estimation. Section 4.5 provides the empirical results and Section 4.6 concludes the
chapter.
4.2 Related Literature
A debt covenant or a contract between the lender and borrower is designed to mitigate
agency problems, especially those arising from conflicts between shareholders and bondholders.
A typical covenant contain terms that restrict the borrowing firm from engaging value destroying
or risk shifting activities. In exchange, the borrower often receives more favorable loan terms
and/or more credit from the lender.
Prior literature shows that creditor influences over covenant violators include reducing
investment to reduce net debt issuance and even firing underperforming CEOs (Roberts and Sufi,
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2009; Nini et al., 2011; Ozelge and Saunders, 2011). If a borrowing firm breaches the loan
contract or violates the covenant, the borrower technically defaults on the loan, resulting in loan
recall or accelerated loan payments. Technically, the control rights are transferred to the lender
upon the violation, thus leading to the intervention by the lender that significantly affects the
borrowing firms’ operation regarding investment and financing activities (Baird and
Rawsmussen, 2006). Recently, Chava and Roberts (2008) show that technical defaults, despite
the available option of renegotiation, are associated with the transfer of control rights from
shareholders to lenders, which lead to a reduction in firms’ capital expenditures.
Several empirical studies also show that covenant violations or technical defaults are
usually triggered by deteriorating corporate conditions (Beneish and Press 1993; El-Gazzar
,1993), and that defaults translate into material costs and negative stock returns for offending
firms (Beneish and Press 1993, 1995). This research contributes to the growing body of literature
on the effect of covenant violations on firm behavior (e.g., Beneish and Press 1993, 1995;
Dichev and Skinner 2002; Chava and Roberts 2008; Roberts and Sufi 2009).
I make the following contributions to this literature. First, I provide a different analysis of
the impact of covenant violations on corporate financing behavior. More specifically, I directly
quantify the effect of violations on the cost of equity capital implied by analysts’ earnings
forecasts revisions surrounding violations. Second, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first
study on the impact of covenant violations on the underpricing of seasoned equity offerings. My
results on the underpricing of seasoned equity offerings suggest that creditors also play an
important role in firm’s financing decisions, especially during the period immediately following
covenant violations.
4.3 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
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To examine the effect of covenant violations on the cost of capital, I start with the
sample of covenant violation provided by Nini et al. (2008), and then use a web crawler to
extend their sample until the end of 2011. I update their sample using the same technique as
described in their paper. Specifically, I program a web crawler that is able to search every 10-K
annual filing to identify whether a firm violates a covenant by retrieving needed information
based on certain phrases. This is accomplished by linking each firm year observation from our
sample to its respective 10-Q or 10-K SEC filing through CIK identifier provided by both SECEdgar database and Compustat.
I use the program to search seven phrases in each electronic filing on SEC’s Edgar
database that may indicate whether a firm violates a covenant. The six phrases include
“covenant,” “waiv,” “viol,” “in default,” “modif,” and “not in compliance”. Whenever the
program finds one of the search phrases, it pulls the related information such as CIK and
GVKEY from the filings and downloads the paragraph containing such phrases into an excel file
for further manual check to avoid a Type I error. Type I errors occur when the search program
finds the search terms in the firm year observation in question and identifies a firm as having a
line of credit when in fact it has not accessed a line of credit during that year.
I create a dummy variable (Violation) that takes the value of 1 if a firm violates covenants
in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. Using CIK identifier and links provided by SEC on its
website, the text search program is able to identify 4,538 firms with at least one violation over
the period of 1996-2011. I exclude financial firms from the sample and then match the sample
with the Compustat/CRSP and the Institutional Broker’s Estimate System (IBES) to retrieve
analysts’ earnings forecast, stock price, and other accounting variables to estimate the implied
cost of capital. I also require that all four measures of cost of equity be available to calculate the
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mean of four estimates in order to mitigate measurement errors in each model. After data loss
due to missing data from merging, estimating the implied cost of equity, and constructing control
variables, the actual usable size of the dataset consists of 1,028 first time violations during the
sample period. Table 4.1 summarizes this sample selection process.

Table 4.1 Sample Selection Process
This table presents the sample selection process. The original sample includes 4,538 first violation during 19962011. I first match the initial sample to Compustat/CRSP and IBES to obtain analysts’ earnings forecasts, stock
prices, and accounting variables. I delete financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999). I also delete the observations with
insufficient data to estimate the implied cost of equity capital based on four models. I also delete observations with
missing control variables. This selection process results in a final sample including 1,028 firms.

Sample Selection Process

Observations (N)

Number of firms with at least one covenant violation during 2006-2011 (update Prof.
Sufi’s covenant violation dataset until 2011)
Match to Compustat to obtain accounting data (book value equity) and delete financial
industries(SIC code 6000-6900)
Match to CRSP to obtain stock price at month (-1 and +1) before and after the violation
month.
Match to IBES to obtain analyst’s forecasts at the month (-1 and +1) before and after
the violation month

4,538
3,565
2,237
1,375

Delete firms with missing data for regressions

374

Final Sample

1,028

For robustness tests, I also generate a random sample of 300 firms from the violating
sample. I then create a matched sample of 300 firms from the non-violating sample based on the
propensity score matching technique. This technique allows me to match non-violating firms on
the basis of their estimated likelihood of violating covenants. I directly estimate firms’
propensity to violate covenants based on covenant tightness (covenant slacks) and firm
characteristics, and then I match violating firms to those firms that are not in violation of
covenants based on this propensity during the same period. I follow Murfin (2012) to construct
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financial statement covenant slacks. Slack is measured as the difference between the observed
ratio and the minimum allowable ratio as indicated in a loan contract. I retrieve covenant
information for each violating firm from DealScan database. I then merge covenant levels of
each firms’ loan contracts with accounting data available from Compustat using a link file
provided by Michael Roberts and Sudheer Chava as used in their paper in 2008. I measure
covenant slack using quarterly Compustat data for each firm with the following financial
statement covenants: current ratio, interest coverage, quick ratio, and debt to EBITDA, debt to
tangible net worth, tangible net worth, and net worth.

Table 4.2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics and percentile of the distribution of
various financial liquidity ratios and solvency measures for firms in violation of a financial
covenant, and Panel B presents these for the random sample of violating firms. I generate the
random sample of 300 firms from the violating sample, and create a matched sample of 300
firms from the non-violating sample based on the propensity score matching technique. This
technique allows me to match non-violating firms on the basis of their estimated likelihood of
violating covenants. I directly estimate firms’ propensity to violate covenant based on covenant
tightness (covenant slacks) and firm characteristics, and then match violating firms to those
firms that are not in violation of covenants based on this propensity during the same period.
Slack is measured as the difference between the observed ratio and the minimum allowable ratio
as indicated in a loan contract.
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Table 4.2 Summary Statistics
Panel A shows the distribution of financial ratios for new covenant violators (4,105 firms) at the time of violation
during the sample period 1996-2011. A new covenant violation is a financial covenant violation for a firm that has
not experienced a financial covenant violation in the previous four quarters. I also generate a random sample of 300
firms from the violating sample. I then create a matched sample of 300 firms from the non-violating sample based
on the propensity score matching technique. This technique allows me to match non-violating firms on the basis of
their estimated likelihood of violating covenants. I directly estimate firms’ propensity to violate covenant based on
covenant tightness (covenant slacks) and firm characteristics, and then I match violating firms to those firms that are
not in violation of covenants based on this propensity during the same period. Slack is measured as the difference
between the observed ratio and the minimum allowable ratio as indicated in a loan contract.

Panel A: Distribution of Variables for Final Sample
Ratios

10%

25%

50%

75%

90%

Total Assets (M$)

25

54

148

520

2100

Current Ratio

0.782

1.231

1.846

2.521

2.356

Net Worth to Assets

0.086

0.378

0.487

0.675

0.853

Sales/ Average Assets

0.445

0.768

1.265

1.748

2.415

Operating Cost/Average Assets

0.375

0.0678

1.105

1.534

2.248

Leverage ratio

0.031

0.175

0.314

0.472

0.648

Current ratio

0.734

1.124

1.648

2.546

3.768

Market to Book ratio

0.846

0.984

1.245

1.821

2.605

Payout Yield

0.001

0.007

0.024

0.065

0.176

Panel B: Distribution of Variables for Random Sample (300 firms)
Ratios

10%

25%

50%

75%

90%

Total Assets (M$)

25

54

148

520

2100

Current Ratio

0.423

1.033

1.745

2.214

2.524

Net Worth to Assets

0.064

0.478

0.652

0.875

1.247

Sales/ Average Assets

0.647

1.284

1.967

2.382

2.917

Operating Cost/Average Assets

0.275

0.0583

1.442

1.932

2.784

Leverage ratio

0.056

0.235

0.618

0.437

0.588

Current ratio

1.134

1.524

1.948

2.446

3.368

Market to Book ratio

0.943

1.284

1.548

2.243

2.908

Payout Yield

0.001

0.006

0.064

0.085

0.216
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4.4 Models for Estimating Implied Cost of Equity Capital
I use analyst forecast revisions following a covenant violation to measure the effect of the
violation on expected future earnings. Using a valuation model to estimate the implied cost
equity based on forecast earnings and realized stock prices, I can empirically estimate the change
in the firm’s cost of equity following a covenant violation, and investigate whether the perceived
risks of the violating firms is affected by the violation. It is expected that analysts would react to
the violation announcements by updating their earnings forecasts based on prior accounting
measures. As a result, covenant violations often lead to downward revisions of expected earnings
because violations affect the default risk of earnings, thereby affecting earnings forecasts.
To answer the question regarding how much (if any) of the analyst earnings forecast
revisions driven by covenant violations are attributable to changes in the cost of equity (internal
rate or returns) that investors assign to future cash flows, I estimate the implied cost of equity
capital using current stock prices and published forecasts of future earnings expectation from
IBES database as inputs to the valuation models (see equation (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3)). Figure 1
shows the timeline of earnings forecasts for estimating the implied cost of equity.
Month t-1

Use analyst’s’ forecasted
earnings and stock price 1month prior to the violation date
to obtain the implied cost of
capital prior violation.

Month t0

Violation Date
(10-Q filing date containing
violation announcements).

Month t+1

Use Analyst’s’ forecasted
earnings and stock price 1month after the violation date
to obtain the implied cost of
capital after violation.

Figure 1 Timeline of Earnings Forecasts for Estimating the Implied Cost of Equity .
This figure illustrates the timeline of the earnings forecasts and the implied cost of equity capital estimation. I obtain
the model-based earnings forecasts and stock prices for one month before and one month after the violations to
calculate the change in implied cost of equity capital for violating firms in the sample.
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Specifically, I use the models developed by Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001)
based on Ohlson’s (1995) residual income valuation model, and two others based on Ohlson and
Juettner-Nauroth’s (2001) abnormal earnings growth models developed by Gode and Mohanram
(2002) and Easton and Monahan (2003). Since there is little consensus in the literature based on
which models perform best, I follow (Hail and Leuz (2006) in using the mean (median) of the
estimates from the fours model in estimating the cost of capital for my sample firms. First, the
model based on Gebhardt et al. (2001) is as follows (equation 4.1):
(
Where

)

(

(

)

)

=Book value at time t,
=forecasted ROE for period

FEPSt+1 /Bt+i-1, where

,. For the first three years, I compute this variable as

is the I/B/E/S mean forecasted EPS for year

and Bt+i-1 is the

book value per share for year t+i-1. Beyond the third year, I use forecasted FROE using a linear
interpolation to the industry median ROE. I classify firms into Fama and French’s (1997)
industries.
The future book value is estimated by assuming the clean surplus relation as follows:
, where FDPS is the forecasted dividend per share for
year

, estimated using the current dividend payout ratio (k) multiply

(payout).

Second, the Gode and Mohanram’s (2001) valuation model is as follows (equation 4.2):
(
(
Where

)
)

(

)

represent analyst forecasts of one year and two year ahead

earnings per share taken from I/B/E/S, and DIV1 represents actual dividends per share. Growth
rate (g) is set equal to risk free interest rate.
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Third, I estimate the model developed by Easton and Monahan (2003) which assume no
growth in abnormal earnings beyond period two as follows (equation 4.3):
(

(

)

)

The dividend payout ratio is calculated by dividing dividends by earnings. I assume
earnings account for 6 percent for firms with negative earnings to obtain the payout ratio.
Finally, I use the modified PEG ratio model by Easton (2004) to estimate implied cost of
equity by using a numerical approximation program to solve for

that equates the right hand

and left hand sides of the following equation with a difference of $0.001. This model requires
that

(

)

(

).
(

)

(

)

(

)

( )

(

)

4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Impact of Covenants Violation on Implied Cost of Equity Capital
Table 4.3 and 4.4 compares the levels of implied cost of equity capital for the firms in
violation of covenants based on analysts’ earnings forecasts one-month before and one month
after the violations as shown in the Figure 1. I estimate the cost of equity capital that is implied
in analysts’ earnings forecasts and current stock prices based on four models presented in Section
4.4. All continuous variables for cost of equity estimation and regression analysis are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. Table 4.3 shows the change in the implied cost of
equity capital by industry over the sample period. Generally, the implied cost of equity capital
increase significantly after covenant violations for firms across almost all industries.
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Table 4.3 Change in the Mean of Implied Cost of Equity
This table shows the change in the implied cost of equity capital following covenant violations by industry over the
sample period 1996-2011 estimated from four models introduced by Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), Gode
and Mohanram (2003), Easton and Monahan(2003), and Easton (2004). I obtain the model-based earnings forecasts
and stock prices for one month before and one month after the violations to calculate the change in implied cost of
equity capital for violating firms in the sample. I use t-tests to compare the means of two groups.
No

Fama-French 48 Industry Classification

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Agriculture
Food Products
Candy & Soda;
Recreation
Entertainment;
Printing and Publishing
Consumer Goods
Apparel
Healthcare
Medical Equipment
Pharmaceutical Products
Chemicals
Rubber and Plastic Products
Textiles
Construction Materials
Construction
Steel Works Etc
Fabricated Products
Machinery
Electrical Equipment
Automobiles and Trucks
Aircraft
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment
Defense
Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining
Coal
Petroleum and Natural Gas
Communication
Personal Services
Business Services
Computers
Electronic Equipment
Measuring and Control Equipment
Business Supplies
Shipping Containers
Transportation
Wholesale
Retail
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels
Other

Before
%
12.17
9.43
11.64
10.23
9.28
12.51
9.96
9.61
9.73
7.81
8.84
9.35
11.79
14.93
9.80
11.93
11.32
10.74
9.67
9.15
11.65
8.45
10.31
7.78
7.61
13.22
9.14
10.23
8.53
9.05
9.69
8.76
7.13
10.26
9.54
9.71
9.66
8.38
8.58
8.88

After
(%)
13.05
9.95
11.91
10.39
11.30
13.60
11.86
10.26
10.16
8.23
8.40
10.98
11.03
14.71
10.50
12.78
9.79
10.21
9.79
9.74
12.80
8.55
11.30
12.82
7.97
12.95
9.46
10.89
9.85
11.94
10.36
9.14
6.95
10.86
9.98
8.88
9.71
9.19
8.95
9.39

Difference
0.88
0.52
0.27
0.16
2.02
1.09
1.9
0.65
0.43
0.42
-0.44
1.63
-0.76
-0.22
0.7
0.85
-1.53
-0.53
0.12
0.59
1.15
0.1
0.99
5.04
0.36
-0.27
0.32
0.66
1.32
2.89
0.67
0.38
-0.18
0.6
0.44
-0.83
0.05
0.81
0.37
0.51

T-test
p_value
p<0.01
p<0.01
p<0.01
p<0.00
p<0.01
p<0.01
p<0.01
p<0.01
p>0.05
p>0.10
p>0.10
p<0.01
p>0.10
p>0.10
p<0.01
p<0.01
p<0.01
p>0.05
p<0.01
p<0.01
p<0.01
p>0.05
p<0.01
p<0.01
p<0.01
p>0.10
p<0.01
p<0.01
p<0.01
p<0.01
p<0.10
p<0.01
p<0.01
p<0.01
p<0.02
p>0.05
p<0.04
p<0.05
p<0.06
p<0.07

Table 4.4, Panel A provides the mean and median of the cost of equity capital based on
Gebhardt et al’s. (2001) model. Specifically, a firm violating a debt covenant, on average,
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experiences an increase in the cost of equity capital from 11.47 % to 12.43 %, which is an 8.36
% increase during the sample period 1996-2011. The difference is statistically significant at 1
percent. This reflects higher perceived operating risk implied by revised earnings forecasts and a
change in stock prices following a covenant violation.
Similarly, Table 4.4, Panel B, C, and D present the estimates of cost of equity capital for
the sample firms implied by earnings forecasts and stock prices one month before and after
covenant violations based on Gode and Mohanram’s (2001), Easton and Monahan’s (2003), and
the modified PEG- Easton’s (2004) models, respectively. I observe similar patterns across all
four models. That is, the implied cost of equity capital increases significantly for the sample
firms after covenant violations. Table 4.4, Panel E reports the mean (median) level of four
estimates of the cost of equity capital for violating firms. On average, the cost of equity capital
for the sample firms experiences a statistically significant increase from 12.37 % to 13.42 %
following a covenant violation, which is a 8.48 % increase.
Table 4.5 shows the results obtained from the random and matched samples based on
propensity score matching method. Table 4.5, Panel A presents four estimates of the implied cost
of equity capital for the random sample firms in violation of covenant while Table 4.5, Panel B
presents estimates of the implied cost of equity capital for the matched sample firms. The results
in Table 4.5, Panel A are generally consistent with those showed in Table 4.4. Firms with
covenant violations in the random sample experience a 13.4% statistically significant increase in
the cost of equity capital (from 12.39 % to14.05 %), while firms without covenant violation in
the matched sample experience no significant change in the cost of equity capital over the same
period.
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Table 4.4 Change in Implied Cost of Equity Capital Following Covenant Violations
This table shows the change in the implied cost of equity capital following covenant violations estimated from four
models introduced by Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan(2001), Gode and Mohanram (2003), Easton and
Monahan(2003), and Easton (2004). I obtain the model-based earnings forecasts and stock prices for one month
before and one month after the violations to calculate the change in the implied cost of equity capital for violating
firms in the sample. I use t-tests (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) to compare the means (medians) of two groups.
Model

Full Sample
Mean (%)

Panel A: Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan
(2001)

Before

After

Before

After

11.47

12.43

9.56

9.11

T-test (mean); Wilcoxon (median)
Difference (t-statistics for t-test/ z-statistics for
Wilcoxon)
Panel B: Gode and Mohanram (2003)

0.963**
(-2.19)
12.73

T-test (mean); Wilcoxon (median)
Difference (t-statistics for T-test/ z-statistics for
Wilcoxon)

Panel C: Easton and Monahan (2003)

13.66

0.45*
(-1.68)
12.36

0.93***
(3.53)

12.96

T-test (mean); Wilcoxon (median)
Difference (t-statistics for t-test/ z-statistics for
Wilcoxon)

Panel D: The Modified PEG Ratio by Easton
(2004)

Median (%)

14.06

0.99**
(1.97)

13.68

1.10**
(2.12)

14.41

T-test (mean); Wilcoxon (median)
Difference( t-statistics for t-test/ z-statistics for
Wilcoxon)

16.54

2.86
(0.08)

14.89

13.87

0.048**
(3.56)

12.37

13.35

13.42

14.52
0.65
(0.75)

12.24

13.33

Panel E: Average all four models
T-test (mean); Wilcoxon (median)
Difference (t-statistics for t-test/ z-statistics for
Wilcoxon)

1.05**
(2.86)
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1.09*
(1.64)

Table 4.5 Change in Implied Cost of Equity Capital Following Covenant Violations for Random
Samples Based on the Propensity Score Matching Technique
I generate a random sample of 300 firms from the violating sample. I then create a matched sample of 300 firms
from the non-violating sample based on the propensity score matching technique. This technique allows me to match
non-violating firms on the basis of their estimated likelihood of violating covenants. I directly estimate firms’
propensity to violate covenant based on covenant tightness (covenant slacks) and firm characteristics, and then I
match violating firms to those that are not in violation of covenants during the same period. Slack is measured as the
difference between the observed ratio and the minimum allowable ratio as indicated in a loan contract. The
propensity score is calculated using a probit regression of covenant violation on the log of total assets, profitability,
current ratio, leverage, coverage, market to book ratio, industry, and financial covenant slacks to control for
borrower characteristics. I use t-tests (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) to compare the means (medians) of two groups.
Model

Panel A: Random Violation Sample
(N=300)
Mean (%)

Gebhardt, Lee, and
Swaminathan (2001)
T-test/ Wilcoxon
(difference and p-value)
Gode and Mohanram
(2003)
T-test/ Wilcoxon
(difference and p-value)
Easton and Monahan
(2003)
T-test/ Wilcoxon
(difference and p-value)
The Modified PEG
Ratio by Easton (2004)
T-test/ Wilcoxon
(difference and p-value)

Means (four models)

T-test/ Wilcoxon
(difference and p-value)

Median (%)

Panel B: Matched Sample Based on
Propensity Score Matching (N=300)
Mean (%)

Median(%)

Before

After

Before

After

Before

After

Before

After

10.90

12.73

9.70

9.15

7.73

7.61

7.78

7.76

1.83***
(p-value<0.00)
11.89

13.90

2.01***
(p-value<0.00)
13.08

14.96

1.88***
(p-value<0.00)
13.76

14.63

0.87**
(p-value<0.00)

12.39

14.05

1.67**
(p-value<0.00)

-0.555
(p-value>0.1)
11.95

13.79

1.84*
(p-value>0.05)
15.50

17.74

2.24**
(p-value<0.01)
14.35

14.49

0.14
(p-value>0.1)

12.88

13.79

0.91
(p-value>0.1)
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0.12
(p-value>0.1)

-0.02
(p-value>0.1)

13.05

13.22

13.52

12.59

0.47
(p-value<0.01)

-0.63
(p-value>0.1)

12.21

9.34

12.75

10.25

0.54
(p-value>0.1)

0.91
(p-value>0.1)

10.88

10.74

9.19

9.01

-1.69
(p-value>0.01)

-1.73*
(p-value>0.05)

10.96

10.27

10.76

-0.19
(p-value>0.1)

9.90

-0.36
(p-value>0.1)

Overall, the results in Table 4.4 and 4.5 provide evidence that firms are more likely to
experience a significantly higher level of cost of equity capital resulting from higher perceived
risk following a covenant violation as implied by analysts’ earnings forecast revisions and a
change in stock prices.
4.5.2 Covenant Violations and the Propensity of Equity Issuance
One of my predictions in this study is whether covenant violations have significant
impact on the likelihood of equity issuance. This section presents the results from the logistic
regression that examines whether the creditor requires the violating firm to issue new equity to
lower leverage. Prior studies (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999;
Hovakimian et al., 2001; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Alti and
Sulaeman, 2012) show that firms with high market-to-book ratio (overvaluation or high level of
misvaluation), high leverage ratio, high level of financial deficits, and high cumulative returns
prior to SEOs are more likely to issue equity. For example, firms with high market-to-book ratios
are often growing quickly and more likely to issue equity. Also, the market-to-book ratio can be
used as a proxy for manager’s perceptions of misvaluation, if the managers think investors are
irrational and time the market by raising equity when the cost of equity is unusually low (Myers
and Majluf, 1984; Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Therefore, I model the likelihood of issuing equity
following a covenant violation during the sample period as a function of firms’ market-to-book
(MB) ratio, plus other control variables, including covenant violation dummy (Viodummy),
cumulative market adjusted returns one year prior to the new offerings (Pre_return), leverage
ratio(Leverage), financing deficit (Deficit), profitability (EBITDA), firm size (Size), and capital
expenditure (CAPEX).
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The logistic regression specification is as follows:
Pr (Equity issuance decision =Yes) =
Where
u=β0 + β1(Viodummy)+β2MB+ β3Pre_return+ β4Leverage+ β5Deficit
+β6Profitability +β7Size + β8CAPEX + ε, (model 4.5.1)

(4.5)

The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable (Seodummy) that equals one if the
violating firm does an SEO in the given year during three years immediately following a
covenant violation, and zero otherwise. I obtain new equity offerings for the period 1996-2012
from SDC database. After matching and deleting missing data due to the constructions of control
variables, I am able to identify a total of 3,707 seasoned equity offerings during the sample
period, out of which 519 new offerings are conducted by firms that have experienced a financial
covenant violation in the previous three years.
To address the concern that the history of concurrent increases in external funding needs
and the market-to-book ratio are possibly affected by underlying firm characteristics rather than
by market timing activity, I further decompose the market-to-book ratio into three components to
better capture the likelihood of equity issuance if firms engage in equity market timing based on
the Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan’ (RKRV) (2005) market-to-book decomposition
technique9.

9

See further discussions in chapter 3, section 3.4.2
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Pr (Equity issuance decision =Yes) =
Where
u=β0 + β1 (Viodummy)+β2FSE+ β3LRV + β4TSE + β5 Pre_return

+β6Leverage+ β7Deficit+β8Profitability +β9Size + β10CAPEX + ε, (model 4.5.2)

(4.6)

Table 4.6 presents the logistic regression results. I capture the overvaluation by using
market-to book ratio (MB) in model 4.5.1 (equation 4.5) and firm specific error (market timing)
(FSE) in model 4.5.2 (equation 4.6). Consistent with prior literature, the coefficients on MB
(FSE), Pre_return, Leverage, and Deficit are all positive and statistically significant at 1 percent,
suggesting that firms with high market-to-book ratio or high level of misvaluation, high leverage
ratio, high level of financing deficit, and high cumulative returns prior to SEOs are more likely to
issue equity.
The magnitudes and signs of the coefficients on a set of control variables in both models
are very similar if the market-to-book ratio is replaced with the firm specific error (FSE) and the
other two components of RKRV’s (2005) market-to-book decomposition (TSE and LRV). In
addition, the coefficients on the covenant violation dummy (0.0533, t-value=1.98, and 0.0847, tvalue=2.34 for model 4.5.1 and 4.5.2, respectively) are statistically positive in both models.
The positive coefficients indicate that violating firms are more likely to issue equity
following a covenant violation during the sample period to reduce leverage. The results suggest
that creditors have substantial influence over the financing decisions of covenant violators.
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Table 4.6 Logistics Regression Analysis
Logistic regression analysis of the seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) decision as a function of firm’s market to book
(M/B) ratio ( model 4.5.1), firm specific error (FSE), Long-run misvaluation (LRV), Time-series error (TSE) in
model 4.5.2), covenant violation dummy, and other control variables including size, capital expenditures (CAPEX),
financial leverage, financing deficit, tangible assets, pre-SEO market adjusted returns (Run-up) over the 12 months
ending immediately before the year of SEOs, profitability. Independent variables are lagged one year before the
SEO year. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses.

Intercept

Viodummy

MB (market to book)

Model (4.5.1)
coefficients

Model(4.5.2)
coefficients

(1)
-0.1197***

(2)
-3.2836***

(-15.82)

(-13.51)

0.0533**

0.0847**

(1.98)

(2.34)

0.2153***
(4.88)
0.6545***

FSE (Firm specific error)

(3.71)
0.8971***

LRV ( Long-run value to book value)

(3.66)
0.1916

TSE (Time-series sector error)

(0.77)
0.1601***

0.5425***

(6.69)

(4.86)

0.3921

0.6845***

(2.96)

(3.53)

Deficit (Financing deficit)

0.2632

0.3429
(1.35)

Profitability (EBITDAt-1)

(0.82)
0.3958
(1.25)

(1.87)

-0.0023**

-0.0350

(-2.18)

(-3.58)

0.4325

0.1361

(0.49)

(0.24)

0.0728

0.0948

Pre_Return (12-month returns before SEOs)

Leverage (Financial leverage)

Sizet-1

CAPEXt-1( Capital expenditure)

Pseudo R2
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0.6383

4.5.3 Covenant Violation and the Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offerings
Prior literature has documented significant underpricing in seasoned equity offerings
(e.g., Corwin (2003, Mola and Loughan (2004)). SEO underpricing occurs when the offer price
is lower than the closing price on the day prior to the offer date. Scholars have developed several
theories to explain the underpricing of SEOs. For example, information asymmetry theory (e.g.,
Myers and Majluf (1984)) explains that managers are tempted to mislead outside investors by
issuing equity when their stocks are overvalued.
Anticipating such a tactic, outside investors will discount the prices they are willing to
pay for the firms’ new shares. Thus, higher levels of information asymmetry should lead to
higher levels of SEO underpricing (discount). Another explanation is that underwriters have an
incentive to leave money on the table for outside investors during SEOs in order to get the job
done, thus enjoying high reputation and recognition from customers. Prior empirical studies
document that the major determinants of SEO underpricing include the level of information
asymmetry, the level of uncertainty about firm value, underwriter reputation, relative offer size,
and conventional underwriter pricing practices (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2002; Corwin 2003).
If a firm violates a loan covenant, the creditor may require the firm to lower its debt level
by issuing new equity or refraining from new debt issues. In the former case, if the firm is forced
by the creditor to issue new equity following the violation to lower leverage, it is expected that
the firm would experience a higher level of SEO underpricing. In other words, if a firm is not
able to offer new equity during a “window of opportunity” or during hot markets to reduce “the
money leave on the able” during new equity offerings, it may have to offer a steep discount on
new equity offerings following a covenant violation in order to avoid possibly severe actions
from the lender. In addition, I hypothesize that the level of information asymmetry would
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increase following the violation since outside investors may not know what actions the creditor
would take to punish the borrower in the event of covenant breach. The prior literature on SEO
underpricing shows that the higher level of information asymmetry is associated with the higher
level of SEO underpricing.
In this section I analyze the effects of covenant violations on SEO underpricing for new
offerings conducted during a three year period after covenant violation. Our hypothesis is that
firms conducting new equity offerings following a covenant violation are more likely to
experience a higher degree of SEO underpricing.
To test this hypothesis, I use the following regression specifications:
Underpricing = β0 + β1Viodummy+β2PreCar +β3IPOUnderpricing
+β4Volatility+β5Offersize+β6Rank+β7Size+ β9NASDAQ+ε,

(model 4.5.3) (4.7)

Underpricing = β0 + β1Viodummy+β2PreCar +β3IPOUnderpricing +β4Volatility
+β5Offersize +β6Rank+β7Tick+β8Size+β9NASDAQ+ε,

(model 4.5.4) (4.8)

Underpricing = β0 + β1Viodummy +β2PreCar +β3IPOUnderpricing +β4Volatility
+β5Offersize +β6Rank +β7Tick +β8Size+ β9Beta+ β10NASDAQ+ε,

(model 4.5.5) (4.9)

Our dependent variable is Underpricing, defined as the closing price on the offer day
minus the offer price, divided by the offer price. I also use the second proxy for Underpricing,
namely Discount for our regressions. Discount is the closing price on the day prior to the offer
minus the offer price, divided by the closing price on the day prior to the offer.
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Along with our variable of interest, Viodummy, I also include a set of explanatory
variables that are widely adopted in the literature. First, Volatility variable, proxied for stock
price uncertainty, is defined as the standard deviation of stock returns over the period of 30
trading days ending 10 days prior to the offer date. I expect a positive coefficient on Volatility
since Corwin (2003) finds higher return volatility is associated with higher levels of
underpricing. Second, PreCar variable, proxied for pre-offer price run up, is defined as the
cumulative adjusted returns over the period of 5 trading days prior to the offer. I expect a
positive coefficient on PreCar since the literature on SEO underpricing (e.g., Loughran and
Ritter (2002)) has documented that the equity issuers are more tolerant of excessive underpricing
if they simultaneously learn about a post market valuation that is higher than what they expected.
Therefore, issuers who see greater recent increases in their stock price have the edge over their
contracted underwriters in setting the offer prices. This also implies that pre-offer abnormal stock
returns are positively related to the magnitude of the SEO underpricing.
In addition, I follow Corwin (2003) to control for the effects of price pressure with the
variable Offersize, calculated as shares offered divided by the total number of shares outstanding
prior to the offer. I also include Tick, which is a dummy variable equals to one if the decimal if
the decimal portion of the closing price on the day prior to the offer is less than $ $0.25, and zero
otherwise, to reflect the effects of rounded prices on SEO underpricing. Other control variables
include IPOUnderpricing, measured as the average underpricing across all IPOs during the same
month as the SEO and NASDAQ dummy variable that equals one if the issuers are listed on
NASDAQ, and zero if on NYSE or AMEX at the time of offer. Finally, I use Rank to control for
quality of underwriters. I obtain information on underwriters’ ranking for the lead underwriter
for each SEO in our sample from Jay Ritter’s website.
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Table 4.7 reports the results from univariate and multivariate tests of the effects of
covenant violations on SEO underpricing. Table 4.7, Panel A shows that the mean and median
of SEO underpricing of issuers with covenant violations are much larger than those of issuers
without covenant violations. Specifically, the mean Underpricing (Discount) of issuers with
covenant violations are 0.0342(0.0405), while the mean Underpricing (Discount) of issuers with
covenant violations are 0.0285 (0.0348). The difference between the means of two samples is
statistically significant at 1 percent.
With regard to multivariate analysis, Table 4.7, Panel B provides strong evidence to
support my hypothesis. The coefficients on Viodummy are all positive and statistically significant
at 5 percent for all three models. Specifically, these coefficients on Viodummy are 0.0052 (t=2.05), 0.0053 (t=2.08), and 0.0047 (t=1.96) for model 4.5.3 (equation 4.7), model 4.5.4 (equation
4.8), and model 4.5.5 (equation 4.9), respectively. This suggests that creditors may require firms
to issue equity to lower leverage during unfavorable market conditions, thereby resulting in a
higher level of SEO underpricing.
Other control variables are consistent with prior studies. For example, the signs of
PreCar, Volatility, and Offersize are all positive and statistically significant. SEO underpricing
increases with volatility of stock returns prior to SEOs, relative offer size, and pre-offer
abnormal returns. The negative coefficients on Rank suggest that SEO underpricing decreases
with underwriters’ reputation. Also, issuers listed on NASDAD stock exchange experience
higher levels of SEO underpricing.
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Table 4.7 The Effects of Covenant Violation on SEO Underpricing
Panel A presents t-test analysis of the effects of covenant violations on SEO underpricing. Panel B lists coefficients
(t-values) from OLS regressions of SEO underpricing on violation dummy and a set of control variables. P-values
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at
the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively
Panel A: the T-Test Analysis

Group 1 ( 519 SEOs of violating firms)

Mean (SEO Underpricing)
0.0342

Mean (SEO Discount)
0.0405

Group 2 (3,188 SEOs of non-violating
firms)
Difference (Group 2-Group 1)

0.0285

0.0348

-0.00572**

-0.0059***

t-value

(-2.46)

(-3.04)

Panel B: Multivariate Analysis
Model

Model (4.5.3)

Model (4.5.4)

Model (4.5.5)

Intercept

-0.1204***

-0.1197***

-11.99

(-11.23)

(-11.13)

(-11.15)

0.0052**

-0.0053**

0.0047**

(2.05)

(-2.08)

(1.96)

0.1603***

0.1601***

0.1600***

(19.48)

(19.45)

(16.45)

-0.0040

-0.0041

-0.0040

(-1.03)

(-1.02)

(-1.03)

-0.0023***

-0.0023***

-0.0023***

(-2.93)

(-2.93)

(2.98)

0.2532***

0.2527***

0.2371***

(6.40)

(6.93)

(5.86)

0.0070**

0.0069**

0.0071**

(2.26)
(2.26)

(2.26)

(2.32)

-0.0015

-0.0015

(-0.75)

(-0.74)

0.0126***

0.0116***

(6.04)

(5.34)

0.2292

0.0017**
(1.98)
0.2225

Violdummy

PreCar

IPOUnderpricing

Rank

Volatility

Offersize

Tick

Nasdaq

0.0126***
(6.06)
(6.06)

Beta
Adj. R2

0.2272
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4.6 Conclusion
This study examines the impact of covenant violations on the implied cost of equity
capital and underpricing of seasoned equity offerings conducted during the period immediately
following covenant violations. Using a unique data set with 1,045 first-time covenant violations
from 1996-2011 of the US public firms, I perform several robustness tests using different models
in estimating the cost of equity capital implied by analysts’ earnings forecasts, stock prices, and
accounting data and find that the violating firms on average experience a 8.48 % increase in their
implied cost of equity capital.
In addition, I also find a higher level of SEO underpricing for equity offerings conducted
by violating firms during the period immediately following covenant violations. This suggests
that creditors may require violating firms to issue equity to lower leverage, thereby resulting in a
higher degree of SEO underpricing through the SEO episodes
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Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusion

The three essays of this dissertation contribute to the current literature by finding new
determinants of SEO underpricing based on new mechanisms that affect their pricing. In the first
essay, we (co-authored with Oscar Varela) examine the effects of earnings smoothing on the
pricing of SEOs. We explore a new role for earnings smoothing prior to SEO episodes based on
signaling theory. Somewhat in contrast with the earnings smoothing literature based on the
managerial opportunism hypothesis, we provide evidence that earnings smoothing may be used
to signal firm quality to outside investors if firms are able to smooth their earnings for long
periods of time. Specifically, we sorted all SEO firms during the period 1989-2010 into quartiles
based on the level of earnings smoothing prior to SEOs and tested whether firms with a long
period of time with smooth earnings experience a lower degree of SEO underpricing. The
findings confirm our hypotheses that SEO firms with high level of earnings smoothing
experience a lower degree of SEO underpricing. Also, the stock returns and operating
performance of firms with higher levels of earnings smoothing are higher than those of firms
with lower levels of earnings smoothing at least three years subsequent to the SEO.
In an attempt to explore a new mechanism that affects SEO underpricing, I further
examine the roles of lines of credit in the market timing of the SEO. Using a unique dataset with
detailed information on lines of credit, I am able to investigate whether firms accessing lines of
credit would have an option to temporarily delay equity offerings until the market conditions
become more favorable. I find evidence that lines of credit allow firms to actively time the
market. The results are consistent with my conjecture that while not perfect substitutes for cash,
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lines of credit affect the pricing behavior of SEO firms and create more value for current
shareholders by reducing the degree of SEO underpricing. The results hold regardless of
different timing measures and proxies for underpricing.
Finally, I examine the direct effects of covenant violations on SEO underpricing and
quantify the changes in the cost of equity capital following covenant violations. Using well
adopted models for estimating the implied cost of equity and a unique dataset consisting of 1,045
first-time covenant violations from 1996 to 2012, I find that firms that violate a covenant, on
average, experience a 8.48 % increase in the implied cost of equity. I also find a higher level of
SEO underpricing for seasoned equity offerings conducted within two years following covenant
violations. This suggests that creditors may require or force violating firms to issue equity to
lower leverage, thereby resulting in a higher degree of SEO underpricing for the violating firms.
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions
The Altman Z-Score: The measure of a company’s health and likelihood of bankruptcy based
on Altman (1968). The Z-score is constructed as follows: Z = 1.2*(WC/TA) + 1.4*(RE/TA) +
3.3*(EBITDA/TA) + 0.6*(ME/TL) + 1.0* (Sales/TA). WC is defined as working capital. TA is
total assets. RE is retained earnings. EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization. ME is market equity. TL is total liabilities.
Beta: Computed from a regression of firms’ monthly raw returns on the monthly value-weighted
market returns over the rolling five year window ending in the current fiscal year of the offer
date.
Book-to-market (BM): The natural log of the ratio of book value of equity to market value of
equity.
Cash flow: Net income minus accruals.
Cash flow volatility: Standard deviation of quarterly cash flows over the five year period prior
to the offer.
Correlation: The correlation between quarterly cash flows and accruals over the five year period
prior to the offer date.
DA: Total discretionary accruals over one year prior to the offer date.
EPS: Earnings per share (basic) / excluding extraordinary items.
IPOunderpricing: The average underpricing across all IPOs during the same month as the SEO,
where the monthly underpricing estimates for IPOs are obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.
I obtain underwriter ranking sample jay Ritter’s website. Ritter refines Carter and Manaster’s
(1990) ranking method to construct a new ranking database for major underwriters and
underwriters are ranked based on a 0-9 scale.
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The KZ Index: The linear combination of five variables: debt to total capital (positive
relationship), dividends to capital (negative relationship), cash holdings to capital (negative
relationship), cash ﬂow to capital (negative relationship), and Tobin’s Q (positive relationship)
(Equation 3.9). More constrained firms have a higher KZ index and vice versa.
KZ Index = -1.002 x (Cash Flows / K) + 0.283x Q + 3.139x (Debt / Total Capital)
-39.368 x (Dividends / K) -1.315 x (Cash / K)
Market-to-Book (MB): (Market value of equity + book value of debt)/total assets.
Ln(price): Natural log of of the closing price on the day prior to the offer date
Leverage: A firm’s leverage defined as the ratio of total liabilities to asset
Nasdaq: The dummy variable that equals one if the firms listed on the Nasdaq at the time of
offer and zero otherwise.
Ohlson O-Score: The measure of a company’s health and likelihood of bankruptcy based on
Ohlson (1980). Ohlson O-score= -1.32-0.407*Size+6.03*TLTA-1.432*WCTA+0.076*CLCA1.72*OENEG-2.37*NITA-1.83*FFOLT +0.285*INTWO-0.521*CHIN.
Size or market assets are defined as market total liabilities plus market equity (price times shares
outstanding) divided by consumer price index (CPI). TLTA is defined as the book value of debt
divided by market assets. WCTA is working capital divided by market assets. CLCA is current
liability divided by current assets. ONENEG is one if total liabilities exceeds total assets and is
zero otherwise. NITA is net income divided by assets. FFOLT is the funds from operations
divided by liability. INTWO is equal to one if net income is negative for the last two years and
zero otherwise. CHIN is defined as (NI-NIt-1)/(absolute(NI)+absolute (NIt-1), where NI is net
income for the most recent quarter.
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Offersize : Shares offered divided by the total number of shares outstanding prior to the offer.
PreCar: Cumulative market adjusted returns over the period of five days prior to the offer date.
Returns Volatility: the standard deviation of stock returns over the period of 30 trading days
ending 10 days prior to the offer.
ROA : The income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets
Size: The natural log of market value of equity, measured at the end of fiscal year become
available for the monthly regressions.
Smooth: The ratio of standard deviation of net income (scaled by average total assets) divided
by the standard deviation of cash flows from operation (scaled by average total assets). We scale
the volatility of net income by cash flow volatility to measure the extent to which accruals are
possibly used to smooth out the underlying volatility of the firm’s operation. Our primary
measure of net income is net income before extraordinary item scaled by average total assets.
Cash flows equal net income less accruals. Accruals are the change in current assets minus the
change in cash minus the change in current liabilities plus the change in shorter debt minus
depreciation.
Tick: The dummy variable taking the value 1 if the decimal portion of the closing price on the
day prior to the offer is less than $ 0.25, and zero otherwise.
Total_accrual: Total discretionary accruals over the five year period prior to the offer, scaled by
average total assets.
Underpricing: The closing price on the offer day minus the offer price, divided by the offer
price.
Underpricing_discount: the closing price on the day prior to the offer minus the offer price,
divided to the closing price on the day prior to the offer.
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